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 Students are often overconfident (or otherwise metacognitively inaccurate) about 
how they will perform on exams, a condition that can have negative consequences for 
students as they may stop studying prematurely and perform poorly on tests. 
Interventions designed to improve student metacognition have had mixed results, and 
poor transference, potentially because researchers do not completely understand why 
students have poor metacognition. Preliminary data show one reason why interventions 
might not transfer to later tests, students become less confident after taking tests, but 
regain their confidence over just 10 minutes. Because no information was introduced 
during those 10 minutes, participants must have changed the way in which they were 
thinking about their past and/or future test performance, a “Shifting Focus” Effect. I 
propose that students’ confidence follows a similar Shifting Focus pattern between class 
exams, potentially because motivations erode rational metacognitive judgements over 
time. The current dissertation was designed to accomplish two goals: to replicate the 
Shifting Focus effect in classroom and laboratory conditions, and to investigate its 
causes as well as test ameliorative interventions. Experiments 1-3 replicated 
preliminary findings suggesting a “Shifting Focus” Effect across a variety of 
conditions, and although my prior research indicates that students are motivated to think 
positively about their future, evidence connecting motivations to rising confidence was 
inconclusive. Experiments 4-5 tested interventions designed to prevent the Shifting 
Focus Effect. Results indicate that rising overconfidence in students may be prevented 
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through minimalistic interventions in normal classroom settings, and may even improve 
test grades. 
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 Imagine the following anecdote: A student visits their professor, expounding 
surprise at having received a low test grade. Upon review, the student had received 
similarly low grades on multiple previous tests, but reports honestly believing they 
would have performed better this time around. Without evidence of having studied 
more effectively, it seems the student has no reason to have gained confidence after 
past failures, so why do students seem to exhibit overconfidence so often? It seems 
reasonable that students want to perform well on tests, so it may be that when 
estimating their knowledge of course material, and future test performance, their desire 
could lead them to be more confident than they should be. Even after experiencing 
failure, students could be shifting the focus of their self-evaluations from past 
experiences to desired grades, leading to overconfidence. 
 The ability to monitor one’s own learning (referred to as metacognition) is 
essential for students, because they must be able to accurately determine their 
preparedness for exams (Pintrich, Wolters, & Bexter, 2000; Winne, 2011). Ample 
evidence shows that good metacognition and good performance go hand in hand. For 
example, studies have shown that students with higher GPAs or SAT scores are also 
better metacognitive-monitors than students with lower scores (Everson & Tobias, 
1998; Kelemen, Winningham, & Weaver, 2007; Shepperd, 1993) and that higher 
performing students are also better predictors of their own future performance (Bol, 
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Hacker, O’Shea, & Allen, 2005; Kruger, & Dunning, 1999; Saenz, Geraci, Miller, & 
Tirso, 2017) than are lower-performing students.  
 Unfortunately, poor metacognition is rampant in self-evaluations as people 
generally make overconfident self-evaluations (Bol, et al., 2005; Dunlosky & Rawson, 
2012; Foster, Was, Dunlosky, & Isaacson, 2017; Hacker, Bol, & Bahbahani, 2008; 
Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2014; Kelemen et al., 2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Miller & 
Geraci, 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2005, 2006; Rawson, O’Neil, 
& Dunlosky, 2011; Saenz et al., 2017; Szpunar, Jing, & Schacter, 2014). Students are 
often particularly poor monitors of their classroom knowledge, and generally exhibit 
poor calibration (the difference between performance predictions and grades). For 
example, when asked, “What grade do you think you will get on this exam?” students 
are frequently five, ten, even twenty-five grade points overconfident in their 
predictions (Saenz et al., 2017). Furthermore, research suggests that overconfident 
students may not study enough because higher memory confidence is related to lower 
study choice (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). 
Because better metacognition is associated with better academic performance, a 
number of investigators have designed interventions for improving metacognition in 
students. Regrettably, interventions to improve metacognition in the classroom are 
often ineffective, with many interventions failing to improve metacognitive accuracy 
and/or test performance (Hacker, Bol, & Keener, 2008; Nietfeld et al., 2005; Foster et 
al., 2017). Whereas there are some successful interventions to improve metacognitive 
accuracy (Miller & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld et al., 2006), these have not focused on 
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transfer of metacognitive improvement. Furthermore, calibration does not naturally 
improve in students over time. Some speculate that students may “calibrate” their self-
estimations over the course of a university semester by gathering feedback about their 
previous test performance and the types of tests a teacher writes (See also Pierce & 
Smith, 2001). However, calibration is resistant to incremental improvement, even with 
extensive feedback and metacognitive training (Nietfeld et al., 2005). Figure 1 
demonstrates calibration over a university course semester during a study in which 
students took 13 tests, made predictions about their performance, and received 
feedback again and again. Students were unable to improve their calibration over the 
course of the semester despite the extensive prediction and feedback schedule (Foster 
et al., 2017).  
Why do so many interventions fail to produce improvements in calibration? 
Intuitively, calibration should improve with feedback. To calibrate a watch, one checks 
the time from a reliable source and makes an appropriate adjustment to the watch’s 
time, if there is a discrepancy. If such an adjustment cannot be made, it is not 
uncommon for people to use consistently inaccurate clocks by making appropriate 
mental adjustments (e.g., my watch is usually 5 minutes fast, so 2:35 is actually 2:30). 
In a similar way, it seems as though students should be able to improve the accuracy of 
their predictions over time by making educated guesses about their future performance, 
and adjusting their estimates based on feedback (i.e., actual test grades). However, as 
outlined above (Figure 1), student’s calibration does not always improve with 
feedback, even when students are explicitly instructed to use the feedback to improve 
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their predictions. This outcome is particularly strange as (anecdotally) students often 
report feeling more sure about their test grades and predictions as a university semester 
progresses, because they learn more about how an instructor teaches, and how tests are 
designed (See also Putwain & Sander, 2016). So if students do not improve their 
calibration between tests, and across university semesters, what does happen to their 
metacognitive thoughts during this time? 
Metacognition Between Tests 
The accuracy of self-evaluations is affected by the time in which they are made 
(Glenberg & Epstein, 1985; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, Rakow, 2000; Maki & Serra, 1992). 
Sometimes called the “postdiction superiority effect” (Pierce & Smith, 2001), 
postdictions (performance predictions made after taking a test, but before receiving the 
grade) are generally less confident, and more accurate than predictions. This finding 
makes intuitive sense, as people take tests, they may learn about their own level of 
knowledge, as well as the test difficulty and content (Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 
1990; Lin, Moore, Zabrucky, 2001; Maki, 1998; Maki, Jonas, & Kallod, 1994; Pierce 
& Smith, 2001). Anecdotally, many students report feeling less confidence in their 
performance after taking tests (sometimes from, “I think I’ll do well” to, “I think I 
failed”) relative to before the test. 
 If calibration improves after testing, why does that metacognitive learning not 
transfer to later tests in a semester? Preliminary evidence demonstrates that grade 
predictions can become more confident even after just 10 minutes of time after 
completing a test and postdiction. These data stem from a study that compared the 
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efficacy of five different metacognition-intervention designs (Saenz, Geraci, & Tirso, 
2019). Participants completed two tests, made predictions and postdictions about each, 
and completed one 10-minute intervention after the first test’s postdiction, and before 
the second test’s prediction. Importantly, participants were clearly informed that the 
two tests were taken from the same question bank, and were of similar difficulty. In the 
control condition, participants completed maze puzzles instead of an intervention. 
Predictions decreased significantly from before to after the first exam, and stayed 
stable afterwards, this outcome differs from the mostly-invariant confidence students 
produce in actual classes; students learned about their performance, and they expressed 
that metacognitive knowledge before and after the second test. Alternatively, one of the 
intervention conditions appeared detrimental to predictive accuracy (See Figure 2; 
Saenz et al., 2019). Between the two prediction-test-postdiction cycles, participants 
made grade predictions once a minute, for ten minutes. This intervention was designed 
to make people think about predictions for an extended amount of time so that might 
improve their accuracy. Instead, grade predictions became steadily more confident, and 
less accurate, during the ten-minute intervention, an outcome that might mirror what 
happens to student’s metacognitive confidence in an actual classroom! Confidence zig-
zagged, increasing between tests, and decreasing after tests, without any changes to 
available metacognitive information, suggesting that participants shifted the focus of 
their metacognitive judgements away from feedback to some other thought process. 
Why did confidence fluctuate in the repeated predictions condition, but stay 
flatly improved in the control condition? Both conditions involved improved 
 6   
 
calibration after test 1, suggesting that students improved the accuracy of their 
predictions, most likely through a form of self-feedback. Whereas this improvement 
did not happen twice in the flat control condition, it did re-appear in the repeated 
predictions condition after the second exam (Figure 2). Something about making 
repeated grade predictions must have increased metacognitive confidence. No new 
information was introduced, and participants didn’t have the chance to study (as 
students might between real tests), so it seems likely that the repeated predictions 
intervention changed the way participants thought about their past and future 
performance, a shifting focus effect. It may be that thinking about their future test 
performance made students “forget” their self-feedback from the earlier test, but this 
explanation seems unlikely as participants lowered their confidence from the last 
repeated prediction, to the second test’s prediction, potentially refocusing on the 
information they had learned earlier.  
It may be that participants in the repeated predictions condition somehow 
rationalized their past performance and, in contemplating their future, allowed 
themselves to become more confident in the same way a person might regain their 
confidence before re-attempting a failed task. If such a motivational explanation is 
valid, the preliminary data might evidence that people have some metacognitive control 
over their motivated optimism. Although predictions became more optimistic during 
the time between tests (hereafter referred to as the reflection period), they began to 
decrease during the final reflection period prediction, and decreased to a similar extent 
between the prediction and postdiction for the second exam (Figure 2). These decreases 
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in confidence may indicate that people are metacognitively wary of the optimism they 
are putting out, or at least that they face some form of anxiety as the final test 
approaches, lowering their confidence. There is some evidence for students lowering 
their grade predictions as time of feedback approaches, and that lowered predictions 
were associated to affect and anxiety (Taylor & Shepperd, 1998). This motivational 
explanation might also hint at the way in which confidence increased, it may be that 
time was not the most predictive factor of increasing optimism in metacognition as the 
control condition involved the same 10 minute period between tests, but did not result 
in degraded calibration. Instead, it is possible that as participants thought about their 
predictions, their motivations lead them to become more confident in their future 
performance. These speculations might be tested by varying the length of time, amount 
of predictions, and lab vs. classroom setting of the reflection period. Speculation aside, 
if this outcome can be replicated in classroom conditions, it may help explain why 
students don’t become better calibrated over time, why some interventions work, and 
others don’t. 
Why Don’t Metacognitive Interventions Always Work? 
Interventions may be targeting the wrong mental processes as there yet has 
been no comprehensive theory describing how students in the classroom become 
overconfident. To devise an effective classroom metacognition intervention, 
researchers need to understand the underlying processes that cause inaccurate 
metacognition, and then develop and test interventions that target these processes.  
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What might be the processes underlying students’ poor metacognition? Some 
accounts (i.e., the Dunning-Kruger effect or the Unskilled and unaware effect, Kruger 
& Dunning, 1999) suggest that lower performing students may simply have a harder 
metacognitive task than others, because having less knowledge about a subject makes 
it harder to guess how much is missing1. Unfortunately this explanation leads to a 
circular argument: students don’t know enough material so they are overconfident 
about their knowledge – overconfident students think they know enough material so 
they don’t study, making them perform poorly. Another popular explanation might 
come from social psychology, where the better-than-average effect has been studied 
extensively. This effect states that most people identify themselves to be better than 
average when comparing their abilities to others (Alike & Govorun, 2005; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Most explanations of this effect have 
focused on motivational accounts, suggesting that people focus on their own 
successes, and other people’s failures because doing so feels good (Klein & Kunda, 
1993, 1994; Klein & Weinstein, 1997; Kunda, 1987; Middleton, Harris, & Surman, 
1996; Regan, Snyder, & Kassin, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Wayment, & 
Collins, 1993; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). 
                                                 
1 Note that this varies slightly from the more common understanding of the Dunning-Kruger effect, 
which seems to be commonly miss-conceived. Many people describe a Dunning-Kruger effect to occur 
in the entirety of a person, i.e. a person is generally incompetent and therefore generally overconfident. 
Instead, the Dunning-Kruger actually describes how a person can be ignorant in particular areas, and 
therefore overconfident in some things, but more accurate and competent in others. 
See http://gabrielsaenz.com/unskilled-and-unaware-about-the-unskilled-and-unaware-effect for a list of 
popular-media misconception examples 
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Clearly, students may be motivated to be optimistic about their future test 
performance, and avoid contemplating imminent test failure. Beyond evidence from 
social psychology, mounting evidence suggests that students’ grade predictions are 
strongly influenced by motivational factors, in a number of ways. For example, lower 
performing, overconfident students externalize explanations of their poor grades, 
ascribing these undesirable outcomes to issues outside of their control, such as 
unreasonably difficult questions, or poor instructors, while higher performing students 
attribute their success to themselves (Hacker & Bol, 2004; Bol et al., 2005; Hacker et 
al., 2008a, 2008b). Other researchers have found more direct connections between 
motivational information and grade predictions, indicating that students use 
information such as the ideal grade they would like to get on a test to influence their 
grade predictions above and beyond educational information (such as prior test 
performance or study habits; Saenz et al., 2017; Serra & DeMarree, 2016; See also the 
“better than myself” effect: Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001). My own 
research shows that interventions swaying students away from using motivational 
information to make grade predictions may improve metacognition (Saenz et al., 
2017). 
So how exactly does motivation information sway students towards 
overconfidence? I propose that students’ motivations erode rational metacognitive 
judgements over time as students make optimistic self-judgements to avoid thinking 
about possible negative outcomes. During the time between tests, students may 
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become less metacognitively accurate because they shift the focus of their predictions 
from realistic academic information to optimistic motivated information. 
People are known to avoid thinking about unwanted information (Golman, 
Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017), and are motivated to favor optimistic thoughts 
(Lench & Bench, 2012). I propose that students rely on these same thought processes 
and that their confidence grows without feedback to replace more rational assessments 
of their knowledge. This bias may be particularly detrimental for low-performing 
students, who stand to benefit the most from more accurate assessments of knowledge, 
which could lead them to increase their studying behavior.  
 This explanation can tie together some of the apparently disparate findings in 
educational metacognitive research. The Postdiction Superiority Effect (Pierce & 
Smith, 2001) states that performance postdictions are more accurate than predictions, 
so students should learn and become more calibrated as they take university tests, but 
there is evidence that this does not happen (i.e., Foster et al, 2017). How could students 
take so many tests and not become more calibrated over time? I propose that students 
regain confidence between tests in the same way that participants regained confidence 
in my preliminary data, through some sort of Shifting Focus Phenomena, where 
students change the basis of information they use to make grade predictions. Under this 
Shifting Focus hypothesis, students do become more calibrated after taking tests, but 
become less calibrated by the time of the next test, possibly because they change the 
way they make their grade predictions. During the time between tests, students may 
shift away from making metacognitive judgements based on what they learned by 
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taking a test, towards making metacognitive judgements based on the level of 
performance they wish to achieve, leading to no net-calibration change, as found in 
many longitudinal or intervention studies (i.e., Foster et al., 2017).  
This explanation can incorporate a number of other findings in metacognitive 
literature. For example, interventions that correct overconfidence by improving domain 
knowledge (such as Dunning-Kruger, 1999, Study 4, and Nietfeld et al., 2006) could 
help improve calibration by aligning desired grades with actual grades, whereas 
interventions aimed at motivational bias (i.e., Saenz et al., 2017) may be preventing a 
shift in focus altogether. Another finding indicates that lower performing students, or 
in other words, more metacognitively inaccurate students, are also less sure about their 
metacognitive judgements (Miller & Geraci, 2011a; See also studies showing people 
can “try harder” to make better metacognitive judgements: Buratti & Allwood, 2012, 
2013). Why would students purposefully make overconfident metacognitive 
judgements if they are unsure about them? Would it not be more reasonable to simply 
make less confident judgements, and be surer about them? One explanation for this 
apparent discrepancy would be to say that these students are, to some extent, aware that 
they are being overconfident, but allowing themselves to make overconfident 
metacognitive judgements, possibly because they are motivated to be confident, but 
remember their past test performance. In such a case, a Shifting Focus hypothesis, 
paired with a motivational explanation seems to fit. 
 Based on my preliminary data and the findings hereby outlined, I propose that 
people become less accurate in their self-evaluations (such as test performance 
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predictions) because they discount information by shifting the focus of their self-
evaluations from useful information (such as academic feedback) towards less factual 
information such as their desired grades. The preliminary data showed that, yes, people 
learn about a test shortly after taking it and make more accurate performance 
prediction, but those data also show that they become less and less accurate over time, 
resulting in a significantly less accurate performance prediction for the next exam. The 
proposed motivational explanation for the observed Shifting Focus effects explains this 
outcome by suggesting that people are more accurate in their self-evaluations 
immediately after tests because they base those self-evaluations more on factual 
information, such as how well they feel they performed on the test, any feedback 
information they received (such as their actual test grade), and on other factual 
information (such as how well they prepared for the test). Focusing on this information 
seems adaptive as it may allow one to put an outcome into perspective and accurately 
consider the results of one’s actions. However, as time elapses after a test, and as 
another test approaches, it also seems adaptive to allow oneself to believe one will 
perform well on a future test, regardless of prior outcomes or actions. Indeed, there is 
ample evidence that believing in oneself and being motivated can be key factors in 
one’s success (Cambria & Guthrie, 2010; Feather 1968, 1969; Lench & Bench, 2012; 
Maslow, 1943), and related theories and findings have been reported in other academic 
fields (economics: Bénabou & Tirole, 2002; Business: Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, 
206). Therefore, why wouldn’t a person naturally tend towards being confident in their 
future performance? Unfortunately, this confidence may also lead a person to study 
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less than they need to, thinking that they know more than they actually do. Regaining 
confidence can be an adaptive motivational habit, but arriving at overconfidence may 
be a maladaptive self-regulatory mistake. In other words, the ability to regain 
confidence, that might normally allow people to try again after failure, may also be 
causing certain students to become overconfident, and under-study for tests, because it 
leads them to shift the focus of their metacognitive judgements towards desired 
outcomes instead of factual academic information. 
The Current Studies 
 To investigate the Shifting Focus Hypothesis, observe whether a motivational 
explanation fits, and to better understand how these ideas fit metacognitive literature, 
the current experiments were designed to gather data on the following research 
questions: 
1) Why are test-performance predictions inaccurate and often overconfident? 
Can the pattern of prediction accuracy fluctuation found in the preliminary 
data (the Shifting Focus effect) be replicated?  
a) Are these results robust to the particular prediction type (absolute vs 
percentile)? 
b) What factors affect these fluctuations? 
c) Are the answers to these questions consistent across different laboratory 
and applied settings? 
 14   
 
d) Are changes in prediction accuracy more strongly related to the amount of 
time between predictions, or the amount of thought put into those 
predictions? 
2) Can interventions to improve self-evaluations across multiple tests be 
developed based on what we know about the causes of inaccuracy in 
predictions?  
a) Do such interventions interact with the underlying factors in expected 
ways? (e.g., does an intervention based on reducing motivational bias in 
predictions actually do so, in addition to improving prediction accuracy?) 
b) Can such interventions be implemented with minimal interference in the 
classroom? 
The remainder of this section describes how the current experiments addressed 
these research questions, and how these questions relate to the larger body of related 
literature. Why are test-performance predictions inaccurate and often 
overconfident? It may be that performance predictions become less accurate over 
time, as suggested by the aforementioned preliminary data. Can we replicate the 
pattern of prediction accuracy fluctuation found in the preliminary data? 
Experiments 1-3 were designed to replicate and extend my preliminary data in both 
laboratory and classroom paradigms. Are these results robust to the particular 
prediction type (absolute vs percentile)? Experiments 1-3 gathered self-evaluation 
data in two ways: absolute and percentile predictions. Whereas absolute predictions 
simply ask people to estimate how well they think they will do on an exam (e.g., “I will 
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answer 80% of these questions correctly.”), percentile predictions ask people to 
estimate their performance in terms of a percentile rank compared to their peers (e.g., 
“I will perform better than 80% of people on this task.”). Percentile predictions have 
sometimes been used interchangeably with absolute predictions (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003) and serve as an alternate outcome 
variable in any case where an absolute prediction is used. Results from percentile 
predictions are generally similar to those of absolute predictions, but there is evidence 
that percentile predictions amplify changes or differences in metacognition (Hartwig & 
Dunlosky, 2014; Tirso, Geraci, & Saenz, 2019).  
What factors affect these fluctuations? Beyond self-evaluations, data have 
also been gathered on the role of motivational (e.g., desired grades) and educational 
factors (e.g., prior performance) in grade predictions. Saenz and colleagues (2017) 
demonstrated that overconfident grade predictions are associated with strong 
motivational bias. These data support the notion that changes in calibration may be 
associated to changes in the information students use to make their grade predictions. 
For example, postdictions may be more accurate than predictions because students may 
base their self-evaluations on the information they just gained from taking an exam. 
However, as time passes, students may be motivated to shift the focus of their self-
evaluations away from academic information like their prior performance or previously 
observed exam difficulty. Instead, as time passes, people may be influenced by their 
own motivations to become more optimistic, and therefore make predictions based 
more on motivationally oriented information, such as their desired grades.  
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Additional data was gathered to investigate the possible role of anchoring in 
student performance predictions (anchoring factors) as students may be adjusting their 
grade predictions around certain pieces of arbitrary information (See Ferrel & McGoey, 
1980; Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, Barlas, 
1999; See also Footnote 2 for a description of how analytical artefacts can indicate 
overconfidence). For example, could students simply be predicting they will receive 
“average” grades? If both low and high performers simply estimate their performance 
at the 80% mark, low performers may seem less calibrated than high performers 
without there being a real difference in metacognition between the groups. Although 
such predictions would not be unreasonable, they might reflect a course-grained 
metacognitive strategy that does not differentiate between lower and higher performing 
students. In such a case, a ceiling effect would account for high performers more 
accurate metacognition. 
Are the answers to these questions consistent across different laboratory 
and applied settings? Experiment 2 tested the ecological validity of the preliminary 
data by extending the reflection period to a week of time. In university courses, weeks 
of time may pass between two tests. Therefore, if the mechanism found in the 10-
minute laboratory paradigm is the same as the one experienced by students in actual 
classrooms, the preliminary data should be replicable over a period greater than 10 
minutes. Experiment 3.1 asked students in an actual university course to make grade 
predictions before taking two university exams, as well as to make predictions about 
their performance once per day, during each of the class periods (about 5) between the 
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two exams. Experiment 3.2 followed the same procedures, but over the course of a 
month of time, and improved data collection and participant compliance by including 
an incentive to complete study procedures. These data were expected to replicate the 
Shifting Focus effect and motivational/educational interactions of Experiment 1. 
Are changes in prediction accuracy more strongly related to the amount of 
time between predictions, or the amount of thought put into those predictions? 
Experiments 2-3 may also illuminate whether time and/or number of predictions are 
more associated to changes in metacognitive confidence. Because Experiments 1-3 
involved different reflection period lengths, and quantities of reflection period 
predictions, variations in the size of the Shifting Focus effect may indicate a greater 
impact of time or quantity of predictions. For example, a larger confidence change in 
Experiment 1 (10 minutes, 10 predictions) compared to Experiment 3.2 (1 month, 4 
predictions) would suggest that the quantity of predictions is more important than the 
amount of time elapsed since a test for increased confidence. 
Can interventions to improve self-evaluations across multiple tests be 
developed based on what we know about the causes of inaccuracy in predictions? 
Experiments 4 and 5 tested the efficacy of two interventions aimed at preventing and 
eliminating rising overconfidence in the classroom. Both of these interventions were 
designed to be as noninvasive and as low-cost as possible, so as to be widely applicable 
in actual classes. Experiment 4 again asked students to make grade predictions before 
and after taking two in-class exams. During the weeks between these class exams, 
students were asked to make online grade predictions at home at a rate approximating 
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the number of class periods (3 times per week, for four weeks). In addition to making 
simple predictions, students were asked to respond to indicate their initial test grades 
and predictions, this was intended to act as a form of self-feedback. As students recall 
their originally-overconfident judgements, they might hesitate to increase their 
predictions over time, leading to a permanence in the metacognitive learning associated 
with test taking. Put simply, Experiment 4 tried to prevent a Shifting Focus effect by 
reminding students of their past overconfidence while they made new grade 
predictions.  
Do such interventions interact with the underlying factors in expected 
ways? In addition to gathering self-evaluation data during these intervention studies, 
anchoring, educational, and motivational factor data were also gathered to observe how 
the basis of performance predictions was affected by an intervention. Experiments 1-3 
were expected to show motivational factors becoming more associated to predictions 
relative to educational factors as the reflection period progressed. Therefore, the 
relationship between motivational factors, educational factors, and performance 
predictions was not expected to change during the reflection period of Experiment 4 
(and Experiment 5), because the intervention was designed to prevent that very shift. 
Can such interventions be implemented with minimal interference in the 
classroom? Experiment 5 took this intervention a step further and attempted to prevent 
rising confidence in students in the least invasive way possible. Experiment 5 again 
asked students to make grade predictions during two in-class exams. However, instead 
of performing repeated predictions between the two exam dates, students’ first grade 
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predictions were posted alongside their first test grades, so as to remind participants of 
their prior overconfidence every time they looked at their grades online. As a further 
benefit of this intervention, data was gathered on the amount of times individual 
students viewed their grades, allowing for correlation between participation and 
metacognitive change. Students who viewed their grades more often, may be better 
inoculated against a Shifting Focus effect.  
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENTS 1-3: REPLICATING AND EXTENDING 
 
Experiment 1 
This experiment tested the hypothesis that grade predictions can increase in 
confidence significantly over just 10 minutes of time using a within-subjects paradigm. 
Participants took two tests, and made predictions and postdictions about each. 
Participants also completed 10 grade predictions during a reflection period between the 
two tests so they may reflect on their prediction accuracy. Data were also gathered on 
the impact of certain factors can explain this change in predictions (e.g., anchoring, 
educational, and motivational factors). As part of this exploratory replication, 
demographic information was also gathered to investigate individual differences in the 
Shifting Focus effect. 
Methods. 
Participants. One-hundred sixty four (164) undergraduate students were 
recruited through an introductory psychology research pool. Preliminary data showed a 
significant, though small effect size increase in prediction confidence with about 40 
participants (Figure 2). So to investigate performance quartiles (along with a number of 
other moderating: age, gender, race, performance level, and first-generation student 
classification), approximately 40 people per performance quartile cell were recruited.  
Participants were mainly younger-college aged (M = 18.62, SD = .99) with 
86.6% of participants being either 18 or 19 years of age. Participants were mostly 
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female (N = 115 or 70.1%), and mostly self-identified as either Caucasian (N = 98, 
59.8%) or Hispanic (N = 40, 24.4%), with a number of smaller groups (N = 6 African 
American, N = 9 Asian Indian, and N = 11 Asian) that will hereafter be batched and 
referred to as an “other group” due to sample size restrictions. Of the 164 participants, 
only 28 (17.1%) identified as first generation students.  
Materials. All participants completed two logical reasoning tests taken from the 
Official LSAT Preptest of June 2007, and from the LSAT logical/analytical reasoning 
self-assessment modules from testprepreview.com (See Appendix A for sample 
questions). These tests were designed to be very difficult while avoiding floor effects, 
and were the same as those used in the pilot study. Average performance in the pilot 
study was low (M = 37.11, SD = 13.46) by design to give participants ample room to 
improve their calibration between exams and predictions. Each test consisted of 20-
multiple choice questions, to be answered in 20 minutes. Test order was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants responded to a self-evaluation survey before and after each of two 
exams (Appendix B). Each survey began with a self-evaluation question that formed 
the main dependent variables for the current study. Hereafter, these data points are 
referred to as Prediction 1/2, and Postdiction 1/2 for the self-evaluations made before 
and after each of the two exams (test 1/2). The wording of these judgements was based 
on a number of previously published works on this topic (Foster et al., 2017; Hacker et 
al., 2008; Saenz et al., 2017): “What grade do you think you will receive on this test?” 
Each of these judgements was to be the first item on a survey of questions investigating 
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metacognition at each prediction time (see full survey under Appendix B). 
Additionally, the fourth question in the survey asked participants to estimate their 
performance in terms of percentile ranking compared to their peers (a percentile 
prediction and alternate dependent variable). The same survey was used in Experiments 
1 and 2 (Experiments 3-5 used a very similar questionnaire described in Experiment 3).  
Each of the explanatory factors (anchoring, educational, and motivational) were 
investigated using multiple items (See Appendix B). Anchoring was investigated with 
questions 2 and 3: “What is your goal to earn on this test?”, and, “What do you think 
will be the average grade on this test?” Questions 5-11 gauged the extent to which 
students grade predictions were based on academic (5-8: educational) or desire (9-11: 
motivational) –based information. These items were adapted from a recent study 
(Saenz et al., 2017, Study 4) that investigated the role of students’ grade desires in their 
prediction information.  
 Procedure. After providing consent, all participants completed a short 
demographic form before taking two logical reasoning exams and completing self-
evaluation surveys immediately before and after each exam. Of greatest importance, 
each of these four surveys asked participants to estimate the grade they thought they 
would get on a test they were about to take (Prediction 1/2: “What grade do you think 
you will receive on this test? ___%”) or that they had just taken (Postdiction 1/2: 
“What grade do you think you will receive on this test? ___%”) on a 0% - 100% scale. 
Predictions were completed on a survey asking a number of metacognitive and 
academic questions included relevant pre/postdictions, as well as questions about the 
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factors affecting students’ predictions (e.g., grade desires, prior test performance; 
following the procedure used by Saenz et al., 2017, Study 4; Appendix B). Between the 
two prediction-test-postdiction cycles, participants were asked to, “Ruminate on 
making the most accurate grade prediction for an exam similar to the one you have just 
taken”. During this Reflection Period, participants were asked to repeatedly make 
grade predictions, once per minute, for a total of 10 predictions during this 10-minute 
Reflection Period (e.g., Figure 3). Participants recorded these responses on paper, and 
were prompted to make each of these predictions aurally by an experiment proctor. 
Participants were briefly informed about the content tests before their initial 
predictions, and they were expressly told that second exam was very similar to the first. 
 Results and Discussion. 
Manipulation Check. Before investigating the main questions of the current 
studies, a manipulation check was performed to observe whether overconfidence was 
found across the present study. In this, and all further studies, Calibration was 
calculated as self-evaluation minus performance (self-evaluations include predictions, 
postdictions, and predictions made during Reflection Periods). Absolute Calibration is 
the absolute value of Calibration. Indeed, on average all four calibration scores 
(Prediction 1/2 and Postdiction 1/2) were overconfident (p < .001, one-sample t-test 
compared to zero), and all absolute calibration scores indicated significant prediction 
error (p < .001). Furthermore, low performers (first performance quartiles) were 
significantly less accurate and more overconfident than high performers in terms of 
both calibration and absolute calibration (p < .001) across Experiment 1. Note, 
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however, that almost no underconfidence was observed because, following the 
experimental design, the average test performance was very low (M = 36.657, SD = 
17.897), such that all participants had some opportunity to change the accuracy of their 
predictions during the study. Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1 have been 
summarized in Table 1.  
Replicating Preliminary Results: Prediction Accuracy Over Time. Figure 4 
outlines the results of Experiment 1, which replicated preliminary data in its three key 
features including. Self-evaluation confidence decreased from Prediction 1 to 
Postdiction 1 (Feature 1: t(162) = 15.681, p < .001, dz = 1.228; M = 75.13, SD = 
12.266; to M = 53.55, SD = 18.817). Participant’s confidence peaked at Reflection 
Period Prediction 9, which marked a significant increase from Postdiction 1 (Feature 2: 
t(163) = -7.364, p < .001, dz = -.575; M = 53.34, SD = 18.941; to M = 63.12, SD = 
19.779). Finally, Self-evaluative confidence decreased significantly from Reflection 
Period Prediction 9 to Postdiction 2 (Feature 3: t(161) = 7.146, p < .001, dz = .561; M = 
63.41, SD = 19.606; to M = 54.22, SD = 18.169).  
Although the second Feature, an increase in confidence between tests, is of 
most interest, these three Features are the hallmark of the Shifting Focus effect thus far 
described, and may be affecting the way students perform across their academic 
careers. The initial decrease may indicate self-evaluative learning associated with 
taking an exam, wherein students better understand their level of knowledge for that 
domain, and become more metacognitively accurate (as in the postdiction superiority 
effect: Pierce & Smith, 2001). The second Feature, an increase in confidence between 
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tests may mark a mental shift wherein people become more confident, and potentially 
less metacognitively accurate.  
The third Feature, a final decrease in confidence, may mimic the decrease of 
Feature 1 as taking a test generates more self-feedback, and might cause participants to 
refocus their self-evaluations back to being factually oriented, instead of motivationally 
driven. Why does Feature 3 begin to show a reduction in self-evaluative confidence 
before Test 2, when no new feedback could have been generated? There is evidence 
that students are aware of their overconfidence (Miller & Geraci, 2011a), and they may 
demonstrate that by reducing their predictions very shortly before an exam. Other 
researchers have found that, when faced with impending feedback (i.e., something that 
could prove one wrong, such as a medical test), people make more pessimistic 
metacognitive judgements (Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Shepperd, 
Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998), possibly 
because the anxiety of an upcoming test may again shift their predictive focus.  
In addition to the three Features, a number of corroborating analyses were run. 
Paired samples comparisons showed that participants became more confident from 
Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 (t(163) = -6.402, p < .001, dz = .500; M = 53.34, SD = 
18.941; to M = 60.19, SD = 17.920). Repeated measures analyses corroborated the 
interpretation of these confidence differences as incremental shifts as both the rise in 
confidence over the Reflection Period (Feature 2: F(1,163) = 44.156, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .213) and the fall in confidence from Reflection Period Prediction 9 to Postdiction 
2 (Feature 3: F(1,161) = 56.236, p < .001, partial η2 = .259) were significant, linear 
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outcomes. No repeated measure analysis was necessary for Feature 1 because it only 
involved 2 time points, Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1. The linear nature of these 
outcomes suggests that people’s self-evaluations change incrementally. If, for example, 
confidence fell the moment a test was placed in front of a participant, and rose to 
plateau when it was taken away, one might suspect the presence of the test to be 
associated with the change in participant confidence. Instead, however, the linear 
nature of these changes suggests participants become more confident over time, or at 
least over multiple prediction attempts within a 10 minute span. 
 To further corroborate these results, a series of paired samples comparisons 
were run on the supplementary prediction measures: percentile predictions included in 
Appendix B (item 3), that asked participants to estimate their percentile ranks instead 
of simple grade predictions. Running these analyses with percentile predictions 
replicated the first and third Features, significant drops in predictions from before to 
after each test (Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1: t(161) = 8.970, p < .001, dz = .705; M = 
58.78, SD = 13.309; to M = 47.11, SD = 17.033; Prediction 2 to Postdiction 2: (t(146) = 
4.332, p < .001, d = .357; M = 48.61, SD = 16.114; to M = 44.53, SD = 17.413). 
Because percentile predictions are thought to produce more extreme results than 
absolute performance predictions, it may not be surprising that the effect size of the 
difference from Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1 was greater for a percentile prediction 
than for an absolute performance prediction (Feature 1), but this relationship was not 
true for the comparison between Prediction 2 and Postdiction 2 (Feature 3), and there 
was no significant increase in percentile predictions from Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 
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(feature 2: t(156) = -.948, p = .345, dz = -.076; M = 47.05, SD = 17.111; to M = 47.94, 
SD = 16.393). Note, however, that these measures could not be analyzed in the same 
way as were absolute performance predictions for Features 2 and 3, because Reflection 
Period data was not collected for these variables. Further investigation is necessary to 
verify whether the Features of the preliminary data are entirely consistent across 
different types of metacognitive questions, but participants did, at least, become more 
metacognitively accurate from predictions to postdictions. It may be that, because the 
Reflection Period specifically involved absolute judgements, participants did not think 
about their performance in relation to other students, and so did not change their 
relative judgements. To anticipate further studies, percentile prediction results were 
similar across all studies, generally mirroring those of absolute predictions with 
reduced effect sizes and as such will not be reported in subsequent studies. 
 Performance Levels and Prediction Accuracy Over Time. Do both low and 
high performers exhibit the same change in predictions over time? Because low 
performers are often considered more inaccurate and overconfident (e.g., Dunning & 
Kruger 1999), one might suspect that low performers would be more susceptible to 
increasing prediction confidence during the reflection period. Participants were divided 
into four roughly equal groups based on average test performance (performance 
quartiles). Additionally, there is evidence that high performing students are more 
capable of incorporating feedback to improve the accuracy of their judgements 
(Drunning & Kruger, 1999, Study 3), so the opposite might also be true: high 
performers might be less susceptible to regaining overconfidence. Table 2 details 
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Prediction, Calibration, and Absolute Calibration for low and high performer data. Low 
performers improved their self-evaluation accuracy to a similar or greater extent 
(higher effect size) than average for both tests (Feature 1, Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1: 
t(45) = 8.738, p < .001, dz = 1.288; M = 76.52, SD = 13.617; to M = 50.70, SD = 
22.252; Feature 3, Reflection Period Prediction 9 to Postdiction 2: t(46) = 3.719, p = 
.001, dz = .543; M = 61.64, SD = 23.869; to M = 51.51, SD = 19.705), but also became 
more drastically inaccurate during the Reflection Period (Feature 2, Postdiction 1 to 
Reflection Period Prediction 9: t(46) = -4.242, p < .001, dz = -.619; M = 50.04, SD = 
22.460; to M = 61.64, SD = 23.869).  
High performers still exhibited the three Features from the preliminary data, but 
to a slightly lesser (in terms of effect size), though still significant degree (Feature 1: 
t(46) = 7.876, p < .001, dz = 1.149; M = 76.53, SD = 11.017; to M = 59.06, SD = 
15.495; Feature 2: t(46) = -2.797, p = .007, dz = -.408; M = 65.49, SD = 18.891; to M = 
60.32, SD = 16.907; Feature 3: t(46) = 2.853, p = .006, dz = .416, M =65.49, SD = 
18.891; to M = 60.32, SD = 16.907). These results suggest that both low and high 
performers are susceptible to increasing confidence between tests. Although high 
performer’s data seemed to be a less extreme version of low performer’s results, they 
were also in a less extreme case. Both group’s Prediction 1 was an overconfident 76, 
but high performers were inherently closer to being accurate, and so they would have 
needed to compensate less at Postdiction 1, and then would have less room to regress 
during the Reflection Period.  
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Although high performers are often underconfident, increased confidence 
between tests may be entirely adaptive, but because low performers are often 
overconfident, the same behavior may not be adaptive. Regardless, because both 
groups rose and fell in self-evaluative confidence in similar way, it may be that these 
changes in confidence are common to everyone, not just the metacognitively inaccurate 
or overconfident. Although further investigation is needed to confirm these results, to 
anticipate the results from further experiments in the current writing, both low and high 
performers seemed to be equally affected by the three features of the preliminary data, 
except in cases where participant numbers were too low for proper analysis. Further 
analyses of the relationship between the Shifting Focus effect and performance levels 
have therefore been omitted for brevity and due to poor and inconsistent sample sizes. 
  Factors Affecting Performance Predictions. Items 2-3 (Anchoring factors), 5-
8 (Educational), and 9-11 (Motivational Factors, Appendix B) were entered as grouped 
Factors into a series of hierarchical regressions predicting performance predictions, 
each regression using a prediction, postdiction, or Reflection Period prediction as its 
dependent variable. These regressions produced a series of coefficients that showed the 
explanatory value of each of the Factor groups for how participants made their self-
evaluations across Experiment 1 (as was done by Saenz et al., 2017).  
 These groups of variables were entered into a hierarchical regression, with 
items 5-8 entered as a group (Educational Factors), followed by 2 & 3 entered 
individually (Anchoring Factors), and 9-11 entered as a group (Motivational Factors). 
This order was chosen because it may give the most conservative estimate of the 
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Motivational Factors, and the most liberal estimate of Educational Factors, allotting as 
much explanatory power to the Educational Factors first. This type of analysis was 
performed for each grade prediction and postdiction, including those during the 
Reflection Period.  
Educational Factors were expected to have very low explanatory power that 
would rise and fall according to calibration scores, while Motivational Factors would 
have an inverse relationship with Calibration and be consistently high, following 
results from prior experiments (Saenz et al., 2017; Serra & DeMarree, 2016). For 
example, postdictions are known to be more accurate than predictions (Pierce & Smith, 
2001), so one might predict that postdictions would be more strongly associated with 
Educational Factors, and less strongly associated with Motivational Factors, than 
predictions. Finally, Anchoring Factors were expected to have significant explanatory 
power that would stay constant throughout the study, because they were on the same 
scale as the initial prediction, and because there is some evidence that predictions may 
be anchored naturally (Ferrel & McGoey, 1980). Grade predictions made during the 
Reflection Period did not have full self-evaluation surveys associated to them, so 
instead their regressions were run using data from Postdiction 1. Figure 5 summarizes 
the expected findings for the relationships between explanatory factors and calibration 
across Experiment 1. 
Figure 6 summarizes the actual findings for explanatory factor and calibration 
relationships. Anchoring Factors were noticeably more important for predicting grade 
predictions than either Educational or Motivational Factors across Experiment 1. The 
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relationships between Motivational Factors, Educational Factors, and calibration were 
not as clear they were expected to be. Whereas both Motivational and Educational 
Factors followed expected trends at some points throughout the study, they accounted 
for very little variance in self-evaluations, and their effect sizes seemed mostly flat and 
low compared to Anchoring Factors’. 
To anticipate further studies, analyses of the explanatory factors was not very 
illuminating as results seemed inconsistent and, at best, only partially consistent with 
expected outcomes. To simplify this and further explanatory factor analyses, a new set 
of comparisons was devised. Regressions predicting key self-evaluations (Prediction 1, 
Postdiction 1, Peak Reflection Period Prediction, and Postdiction 2) were each run 
twice, once using Educational Factors and once using Motivational Factors as 
independent variables (grouping, and stepwise conditions were eliminated). The effect 
size (R2) of Motivational Factors was then subtracted from that of Educational Factors, 
to produce a bias quotient. A more positive number indicated that self-evaluations were 
based more on Motivational Factors, whereas a more negative number indicated that 
self-evaluations were more based on Educational Factors, with zero indicating a perfect 
balance between the two types. This quotient would then be plotted alongside the key 
self-evaluations to check for expected results. Although this representation did not 
fully align with the expected results or a-priori proposed analyses (i.e., overall 
correlations between predictions and factors), it presented a simpler picture of the 
present data, and may suggest a trend in the way in which Motivational and 
Educational Factor’s relationship changes across multiple tests. 
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Factor analysis data for Experiments 1-3 was summarized in Figure 7. 
Although Figure 6 did not depict the expected inverse relationship between 
Motivational Factors and performance predictions, Figure 7 did seem to show 
Motivational factors becoming less important relative to Educational Factors across 
Experiment 1. However, while there may be a trend in the expected direction, these 
results were hazy at best as Motivational Factors did not become more important with 
rising confidence during the Reflection Period, and changes in the Relative value of 
Motivational and Educational Factors amounted to a less than 10% difference. Further 
data is needed to better understand if and how Motivational, Educational, and 
Anchoring Factors are related to prediction change over time. 
Individual Differences in Shifting Focus. An exploratory set of analyses was 
run to check for individual differences in calibration, as well as calibration change over 
time including comparisons for: age, gender, race, and first-generation student status. 
Calibration and Absolute Calibration were averages across all prediction, postdiction, 
and Reflection Period self-evaluation points, to create an Average Calibration and an 
Average Absolute Calibration variable. ANOVAs were run using the each of the 
previously described demographic variables, but there were no significant differences 
between groups on either Average Calibration (p ≥ .069) or Average Absolute 
Calibration (p ≥ .214). Differences in calibration based on age were closest to being 
significantly different, but this is most likely due to having very small sample sizes for 
participants aged 20 and up. People did not seem to be better or worse at self-
evaluation based on age, gender, race, or first-generation status. Table 3 summarizes 
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these data across Experiment 1, but in brief, none of the demographic groups seemed to 
show sizeable differences in their calibration lines across Experiment 1.  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1 
by extending the Reflection Period to a week of time. There are two reasons for 
extending the Reflection Period. First, this manipulation may help discern whether the 
passing of time, or the amount of thought on predictions is responsible for the increase 
in self-evaluation confidence demonstrated in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 gave 
participants much more time between predictions, and fewer Reflection Period 
predictions than Experiment 1. If predictions increase in Experiment 2 more than in 
Experiment 1, then the amount of time between tests may be more important than the 
quantity of predictions in producing a Shifting Focus effect. If predictions in 
Experiment 2 do not increase as much as they did in Experiment 1, then the amount of 
rumination (or quantity of predictions) may be more responsible for change in 
predictions. Secondly, students in an actual class environment do not experience 
merely 10 minutes of reflection time between class exams. By extending the amount of 
time in the Reflection Period, Experiment 2 may provide data for change in grade 
predictions under a more ecologically valid setting. 
Methods. 
Participants. Because participants self-initiated grade predictions during the 
Reflection Period of Experiment 2, some non-compliance and missing data was 
expected, so 117 undergraduate students were recruited for Experiment 2. Of these, 
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only 88 participants successfully completed the second phase of Experiment 2. The 
smallest effect size of the main analyses of Experiment 1 was dz = .561, an effect size 
with a minimum sample size of 36 (based on power analyses). So the sample size of 
Experiment 2 was approximately twice as large as it needed to be based on effect sizes 
from Experiment 1, in the hopes that this would be sufficient to eliminate non-
compliance issues. Note that, although not all participants completed all portions of the 
study, as much data as possible was used so df values may be drastically different in 
some analyses of this, and all following studies. 
Demographic information for the 117 participants in Experiment 2 was similar 
to that of Experiment 1. Participants were mainly early-college aged (M = 18.91, SD = 
1.70) with 80.3% of participants being either 18 or 19 years of age. Participants were 
mostly female (N = 80 or 68.4%), and mostly self-identified as either Caucasian (N = 
70, 57.8%) or Hispanic (N = 29, 24.8%), with a smaller “other” group of varied race or 
ethnicity (N = 18). Of the 117 participants, only 18 (15.4%) identified as first 
generation students.  
Materials and procedure. The prediction surveys, logical reasoning tests, and 
most procedures were the same as those used as in Experiment 1. The Reflection 
Period for this experiment was extended to one week, so that the experiment was 
completed in two sessions, each including one test and related prediction surveys. 
Participants made up to 7 Reflection Period grade predictions during the extended 
Reflection Period, and were instructed to do so once per day, using an online google 
form. To ensure consistency in participants’ responses, the data were combed for any 
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predictions made inappropriately. For example, participants who made multiple 
predictions during a single day only have their first prediction of the day included in 
the analyses. However, all required predictions made during either testing session will 
be included. No incentives were given for completing the Reflection Period predictions 
to avoid introducing any novel motivational influence. 
Results and Discussion. 
Manipulation Check. A manipulation check was again performed to ensure 
overconfidence levels were similar to those of Experiment 1. Indeed, on average 
participants were overconfident at Predictions 1 and 2 as well as Postdictions 1 and 2 
(p < .001). Low performers (bottom 25% of participants by average test performance) 
were always significantly more confident and less accurate than high performers in 
both Calibration and Absolute Calibration (p < .001). 
Replicating Preliminary Results: Prediction Accuracy Over More Time. 
Because participant numbers change drastically throughout the experiment, a summary 
of self-evaluations, Calibration, and Absolute Calibration across Experiment 2 has 
been included in Table 3. Feature 1 replicated perfectly, participants significantly 
reduced their self-evaluation confidence, and became more metacognitively accurate 
from Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1 (t(115) = 14.513, p < .001, dz = 1.348; M = 74.80, 
SD = 11.693; to M = 51.23, SD = 18.276). Self-evaluation confidence peaked on the 
second day of the Reflection Period, unlike Experiment 1 where confidence rose 
throughout the majority of the Reflection Period. To double-check the data, analyses 
for all three Features were run again with Day 2 and Day 7 (the final Reflection Period 
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Judgement) as the pivoting points for self-evaluations in Experiment 2. Feature 2 was 
replicated successfully (Postdiction 1 to Day 2: t(47) = -6.064, p < .001, dz = -.875; M 
= 49.96, SD = 17.813; to M = 59.40, SD = 15.789; Postdiction 1 to Day 7: t(56) = -
2.865, p = .006, dz = -.383; M = 52.20, SD = 16.387; to M = 56.89, SD = 19.906), 
although participants did not have as much self-evaluative confidence on Day 7 of the 
Reflection Period, so its related effect size was less than the change from Postdiction 1 
to Day 2. Results for Feature 3 follow the previous, with a significant drop in self-
evaluative confidence from day 2 to Postdiction 2 (t(56) = -2.865, p = .006, dz = .383; 
M = 52.20, SD = 16.387; to M = 56.89, SD = 19.906), but no significant change from 
Day 7 to Postdiction 2 (t(56) = -2.865, p = .006, dz = .383; M = 52.20, SD = 16.387; to 
M = 56.89, SD = 19.906). To corroborate, participants became more confident from 
Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 (t(88) = 3.440, p = .001, dz = .365; M = 51.83, SD = 
17.803; to M = 55.52, SD = 18.000). 
It seems as though the change in self-evaluative confidence is not necessarily 
higher as the next test approaches. Though confidence did still increase during the 
Reflection Period, it peaked at Day 2, and seemed to drop slowly until Postdiction 2, 
with no significant changes happening between any of the intervening self-evaluations. 
Although results for Experiment 2 Features 2-3 were partially corroborated by linear 
repeated measures analyses (Feature 2, Postdiction 1 to Day 2: F(2,33) = 27.532, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .455; Feature 3, Day 2 to Postdiction 2: F(1,8) = 1.165, p = .768, 
partial η2 = .068), the data for a repeated measures analysis had an abysmally low 
quantity of participants (N = 9) due to inconsistent participant compliance throughout 
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Experiment 2. Nevertheless, Experiment 2 seemed to replicate the results of 
Experiment 1, and the preliminary data. 
Factors Affecting Performance Predictions. Anchoring, Educational, and 
Motivational Factors were again analyzed in the same fashion as Experiment 1. In 
brief, these factors did not follow expected trends (Figure 7). Motivational Factors 
became more important relative to Educational Factors from Postdiction 1 to 
Postdiction 2, instead of exhibited the expected inverse correlation with predictions.  
Individual Differences in Shifting Focus. An exploratory series of analyses 
were performed to investigate whether individual differences had any effect on 
metacognitive accuracy. Results replicated those of Experiment 1, however, and no 
significant differences in either Average Calibration (p = .063) or Average Absolute 
Calibration (p = .271) were found for any of the demographic variables. The closest 
analysis to being significant was that comparing Average Calibration between age 
groups (p = .063), but this apparently marginal result was due to extremely small Ns 
for participants aged 20+, all other analyses were well above (p ≥ .200) significance 
levels. 
Experiment 3.1 
Experiment 2 replicated the results from Experiment 1 and the preliminary data 
showing that people become less metacognitively accurate during the time between 
tests, But Experiment 2 further found this result to be true for a week-long lab study, 
instead of the 10-minute setting involved in the previous findings. Experiment 3 was 
designed to replicate the results from Experiments 1-2 in a classroom environment. 
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Increases in predictions over time in a classroom environment would establish further 
evidence for the Shifting Focus effect here described, as well as provide its validity in 
an applied environment. Beyond differences in prediction accuracy, data were gathered 
to assess a motivational explanation for the Shifting Focus effect. Although the results 
from Experiments 1 and 2 were rocky at best, the primary area of focus, Motivational 
and Educational Factors, may come into greater play in an ecologically valid setting, 
because real students would actually be motivated to perform well, but have 
educational information at their disposal when making performance predictions. Thus 
the applied nature of Experiment 3 might have produced clearer associations between 
explanatory factors and the Shifting Focus effect. 
Experiment 3 was divided into two parts because Experiment 3 was performed 
twice. The first time Experiment 3 was performed (hereafter referred to as Study 3.1) 
the number of participants was very low, and so was compliance, resulting in very 
difficult data to analyze. Although these data are here presented, Experiment 3.2 
gathered more participants, and improved on participant compliance, resulting in much 
more complete data. Both data sets are reported in full in the interest of transparency. 
Methods. 
Participants. Participants in this experiment consisted of 36 university students 
taken from a Psychology of Learning Psychology and Neuroscience course in the 
summer of 2018. This sample size was limited first by the quantity of students enrolled 
in the course, and second by the quantity that consented to participate. Demographic 
information was not collected because the small sample size may have resulted in 
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privacy concerns. However, participants were of similar proportion to Experiments 1-2 
in every way.  
Materials and Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 3 was similar to that 
of Experiments 1-2, with exception of necessary adaptations for an actual course. 
Therefore, instead of taking two LSAT exams, participants completed two in-class 
exams, spaced a week apart, following the summer-semester schedule of the present 
university course. Participants completed a self-evaluation survey before each of these 
two exams using the same form included in the previous studies. Unlike Experiments 
1-2, no postdiction self-evaluation survey was completed due to time constraints and 
instructor preference. This limitation unfortunately reduces the number of analyses that 
can be run on these data. There were 4 class periods between these two exams, and 
participants made a grade prediction at the beginning of each of these class days. The 
two exams consisted of multiple choice questions, and were the third and fourth exams 
in the course. In addition to the above changes, the self-evaluation survey used in this, 
and all further experiments was altered slightly to better fit a classroom setting. Item 7 
(Appendix B), which asked participants about their prior performance on, “this type of 
exam” was removed.  
Results and Discussion. 
Procedure Check. A series of analyses were performed to check for 
overconfidence levels. Because the sample size was too small to analyze the data in 
quartiles, results were analyzed as a whole group. On average participants were not 
overconfident across the experiment (t(35) = -.339, p = .737, dz = -.056, M = -.500, SD 
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= 8.845). This result may not be surprising as test scores (M = 83.14, SD = 7.948) may 
have been slightly higher than other courses of the same level, and because the test 
scores of the prior two exams were approximately 20 points lower. Nevertheless, there 
was still a significant amount of inaccuracy in Absolute Calibration scores (t(35) = 
9.994, p < .001, dz = 1.666, M = 8.15, SD = 4.890). It is difficult to say how these 
circumstances may affect results. 
Prediction Accuracy over Time. Because no postdictions were gathered in 
Experiment 3.1, it was not possible to observe how self-evaluative accuracy changed 
from before to after each exam (Features 1 and 3). In addition, due to poor participant 
compliance, paired samples comparisons were underpowered, and it was difficult to 
determine the best way to analyze these data. To give the most positive result, Feature 
2 seemed to be replicated in the same was as it was in Experiment 2. Participants 
seemed to become more confident in their performance predictions from Prediction 1 
(M = 80.909, SD = 10.578) to Reflection Period Prediction 2 (M = 85.364, SD = 5.653; 
t(21) = -2.138, p = .044, dz = .456), though this confidence did not necessarily lean 
towards overconfidence. Because data from this experiment was so poor, further 
analyses were not attempted. 
Factors Affecting Performance Predictions. Motivational and Educational 
Factors were analyzed as in Experiments 1-2. Regression results were precisely 
opposite of expected results, Motivational Factors were less important to self-
evaluations (relative to Educational Factors) at Prediction 1 and the Reflection Period 
Peak, times when self-evaluations should have been most important.  
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Experiment 3.2 
Experiment 3.1 had a very small sample size, numerous participant compliance 
issues, no postdictions, and an inter-test interval of only one week (a circumstance that 
does not mimic most academic settings).Therefore Experiment 3.2 involved a second 
class worth of data that did not have any of these limitations.  
Methods. 
Participants. A group of 132 undergraduate students participated in partial 
completion of their introductory psychology course requirements. As in Experiment 
3.1, this was a convenience sample, with sample size determined by the amount of 
willing participants in the course. Experiments 3.1, 3.2, 4, and 5 each were performed 
in class, but although some were the same course, each had a different instructing 
professor. Participants were mainly early-college aged (M = 18.293, SD = .624) with 
95.5% of participants being either 18 or 19 years of age. Participants were mostly 
female (N = 88 or 66.7%), and mostly self-identified as either Caucasian (N = 73, 
55.3%) or Hispanic (N = 32, 24.2%), with an assorted “other” group of varied race or 
ethnicity (N = 27). Of the 132 participants, only 26 (19.5%) identified as first 
generation students.  
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure for Experiment 3.2 
were very near to those of Experiment 2, and mainly differed from Experiment 3.1 in 
that Study 3.2 did not suffer from the same limitations as its predecessor. At the 
approval of the instructor, the same demographic survey from Experiments 1-2 was 
used in Study 3.2. Although Study 3.2 still used the slightly altered self-evaluation 
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survey for predictions, postdiction data were also gathered in Study 3.2. Study 3.2 was 
also performed during a regular university course semester, and so the Reflection 
Period lasted approximately one month, the time between two in-class exams. 
However, to avoid over-burdening class-time, Reflection Period Predictions were only 
made once per week, resulting in only 4 Reflection Period Predictions, in addition to 
Predictions 1/2, and Postdictions 1/2. Finally, compliance issues were reduced in 
Experiment 3.2 by making bonus research credits available for any participant who 
completed the experiment in full. Because of this, compliance was noticeably 
improved, with 61 of 132 (46.2%) participants completing experiment procedures in 
full. This reward procedure was exclusive to Experiment 3.2, and was not used in any 
other experiments of this dissertation. Despite the incentive, not all participants 
completed all experiment procedures, so df values may vary from analysis to analysis. 
Performance quartiles were calculated for the current experiment and analyses. 
Results and Discussion. 
Procedure Check. The data were analyzed to check for overconfidence check 
was again performed to ensure overconfidence levels were similar to those of 
experiments 1 and 2. In terms of average Calibration participants were overconfident at 
Prediction 1 (p = .002) and 2 (p = .001), but they became significantly underconfident 
at Postdiction 1 (p = .006), and were not significantly inaccurate at Postdiction 2 (p = 
.409). Absolute Calibration scores were always significantly inaccurate (p < .001). Low 
performers (bottom 25% of participants by average test performance) were always 
significantly more confident and less accurate than high performers in both Calibration 
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and Absolute Calibration (p < .001). In sum, these data represented a normal set of 
classroom self-evaluations. 
Prediction Accuracy over Time. Self-evaluative confidence was highest at the 
first Reflection Period Prediction, which occurred approximately one week after the 
first exam, this may mirror Experiment 2, where confidence was highest at the second 
day. All three features of the prior experiments were replicated; participants become 
less confidence from Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1 (Feature 1: (t(102) = 9.332, p < .001, 
dz = .919; M = 78.86, SD = 11.758; to M = 71.33, SD = 14.964), more confident from 
Postdiction 1 to Reflection Period 1 (Feature 2: (t(91)= -11.041, p < .001, dz = -1.151; 
M = 72.48, SD = 12.759; to M = 83.43, SD = 7.821), and less confident from Reflection 
Period 1 to Postdiction 2 (Feature 3: Reflection Period 1 to Postdiction 2 (t(90) = 
7.203, p < .001, dz = .755; M = 83.25, SD = 7.646; to M = 75.48, SD = 13.140). Note 
that although the point of greatest confidence occurred at the first Reflection Period 
Prediction, participants also became less confident from Prediction 2 to Postdiction 2 
(t(97) = 2.479, p = .015, dz = .250; M = 77.94, SD = 11.562; to M = 76.28, SD = 
10.787). Furthermore, a repeated measures analysis showed a significant downwards 
linear trend in self-evaluative confidence from Reflection Period 1 to Postdiction 2 
(F(1, 67), p < .001, partial η2 = .499). 
These results suggest that the participating students became more confident 
over the time between tests. To corroborate this point, a paired samples analysis 
showed a significant increase from Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 (t(95) = -6.437, p < 
.001, dz = .657; M = 72.05, SD = 14.128; to M = 78.41, SD = 11.506), suggesting 
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increased confidence from immediately after the first exam to immediately before the 
second. Going further, there was no significant difference between Prediction 1 and 
Prediction 2 (p = .496), nor was Prediction 2 (M = 78.28, SD = 11.009) any more 
accurate than Prediction 1 (Self-evaluation M = 78.94, SD = 10.669; Calibration paired 
samples comparison p = .952, Absolute Calibration paired samples comparison p = 
.777) despite significant accuracy improvements from before to after the first test 
(Calibration: t(99) = 9.137, p < .001, dz = .914; M = 41.64, SD = 9.428; to M = 34.160, 
SD = 12.452; Absolute Calibration: t(99) = 10.952, p < .001, dz = 1.095; M = 41.640, 
SD = 9.428; to M = 34.820, SD = 10.443). So, despite having improved their 
metacognitive accuracy by taking test 1, students’ self-evaluative predictions had 
regressed to their originally inaccurate state by Prediction 2. 
Factors Affecting Performance Predictions. Educational, and Motivational 
Factors were analyzed as in previous studies. Figure 7 depicts the difference between 
Motivational and Educational Factors compared to self-evaluations across Experiment 
3.2. Although some portions of the graph may align with expected results, on the whole 
an analysis of the Factors we gathered to predict performance predictions did not seem 
to yield any results that were consistent with prior analyses of this type. Furthermore, 
any differences in the current analysis were of a very low magnitude (5% or less), as 
they were in Experiment 1, suggesting results may be entirely spurious in nature. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENTS 4-5: INTERVENTIONS  
 
Experiment 4 
 It is clear that students become less confident about their knowledge after being 
tested, an outcome that often resulted in more accurate self-evaluations. Unfortunately 
this metacognitive improvement does not seem to be permanent as people seem to 
become more confident, and more overconfident, between tests. Across Experiments 1-
3 a consistent pattern of results, both from laboratory and classroom studies, showed 
that people tend to exhibit a zig-zagging self-evaluative confidence level as they 
complete two tests, replicating the three features of the proposed Shifting Focus effect. 
Participants have become less confident from before tests to after tests (Feature 1), 
even when those tests are the second of their type or university semester to be taken 
(Feature 3). The rise in confidence between tests may be the cause of students’ 
tendency towards overconfidence. Experiment 4 investigated the efficacy of an 
intervention designed to prevent rising confidence between in-class exams by requiring 
students to remind themselves of their past test performance and past prediction 
accuracy as they made predictions about future test performance between tests.  
Methods. 
Experiments 1-3 repeatedly showed that people become more confident in their 
self-evaluations during the period between two tests, both in laboratory and classroom 
conditions. Although the current evidence was rocky at best, it may be that such results 
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occur because people are motivated to feel they will perform well in the future (Klein 
& Kunda, 1993, 1994; Saenz et al., 2017; Taylor & Brown, 1988) despite prior results 
to the contrary. Because of this natural confidence, some people may be prone to 
overconfidence, leading them to under prepare for exams (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; 
Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b), a dangerous yet 
common outcome. Experiment 4 was designed to help prevent people from becoming 
more confident between tests. The intervention consisted of repeatedly reminding 
students of their past grade predictions and test grades, while simultaneously asking 
students to make grade predictions during a Reflection Period. By making past 
calibration salient during the Reflection Period, and at the time of predictions, students 
may avoid incrementally shifting their grade predictions towards being more confident. 
There is evidence that this type of feedback may “strong” and salient enough to be 
effective in preventing overconfidence (Nietfeld et al., 2006; Saenz et al., under 
review). 
Participants. Participants in this experiment consisted of 85 university students 
taken from an introductory psychology course in the fall of 2018. This sample size was 
limited first by the quantity of students enrolled in the course, and second by the 
quantity that consented to participate, but should still be sufficient based on the effect 
sizes and power analyses from prior studies. Demographic information was not 
collected and at the request of the instructors for Experiments 4-5. However, 
participants were of similar proportion to Experiments 1-3 in every way. This was a 
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hybrid course, meaning that students participated in a regular lecture course once per 
week, and completed 2 class-periods worth of instruction online per week.  
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedures were very similar to 
those used in Experiment 3.2. Although Experiments 3.2, 4, and 5 were each taught by 
a different professor, all three experiments involved two exams, taken about a month 
apart, which consisted of multiple-choice questions. These two exams were the third 
and fourth in the semester for the course. Participants completed the same self-
evaluation surveys as in Experiment 3 before and after each of these tests. However, 
Experiments 4-5 involved an intervention during the Reflection Period. In Experiment 
4, instead of simple Reflection Period Predictions, participants completed a larger 
survey designed to remind them of their prior performance and prediction accuracy. 
The survey consisted of three questions as follows: “What was your test grade on Test 
3 in percent?”, “What grade did you predict you would make on the test, right before 
you took it?”, and, “What grade do you think you will get on the next exam?” 
 At the onset of this study, participants received a brief, verbal overview of the 
experiment procedures, and were informed of the possible benefit of making accurate 
grade predictions (e.g., they were informed, in a 5-minute lecture, that more accurate 
grade predictions may be beneficial to students because they may allow for better 
preparatory behavior like studying sufficiently). Students were asked to complete these 
surveys three times a week, following a 3-class per week schedule. Participants were 
reminded about the repeated predictions procedure once per week to promote 
participation, and in-class bonus points were offered for completing the majority of the 
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study. Despite this, participant compliance was poor, so much of the available data is 
flawed. Given the four-week interval between class exams, participants were be able to 
complete up to 14 grade predictions during this Reflection Period. To put participant 
compliance into perspective, the 85 participants could have completed a total of 1190 
google surveys during the Reflection Period, but a total of 130 (10.9%) were received. 
As in Experiment 2, repeated predictions made within about 48 hours of another 
prediction were not analyzed, resulting in 120 successfully completed intervention 
surveys. 
Results and Discussion. 
Procedure Checks. A series of analyses were performed to check for 
overconfidence levels. Participants’ average test scores (M = 77.451, SD = 10.967) 
were similar to (anecdotally) average scores for the departments psychology tests. 
However, on average participants were not overconfident, producing calibration scores 
that were not significantly different from zero at Prediction 1(p = .071), or Postdiction 
1 (p = .456). Calibration scores were significantly underconfident at Prediction 2 (t(65) 
= -2.513, p = .014, dz = .309) and Postdiction 2 (t(65) = -4683, p < .001, d = .576). 
Although participants seemed to become less accurate and more accurate as the 
experiment progressed, Absolute Calibration scores were significantly inaccurate 
across all self-evaluation points (p < .001), suggesting that self-evaluation accuracy 
merely went from being slightly overconfident at Prediction 1, to slightly 
underconfident at Postdiction 2. These results suggest that the intervention used in this 
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experiment successfully prevented students from increasing their self-evaluative 
confidence between tests.  
There were not enough participants for analyses comparing low and high 
performance quartiles (N < 20 per cell), so median split analyses were run instead. The 
low performing students did not have significantly different Calibration scores from 
high performing students any point in the experiment (p ≥ .097). In terms of Absolute 
Calibration, low performers were less accurate than high performers at Prediction 1 
(F(1,72) = 10.859, p = .002, η2 = , M = 12.257, SD = 10.455, and M = 6.077, SD = 
5.0125) and Postdiction 1 (F(1,72) = 5.578, p = .021, η2 = , M = 10.853, SD = 11.995, 
and M = 5.750, SD = 4.789), but not in either Prediction 2 or Postdiction 2 (p ≥ .501). 
Although performance groups were not significantly different in Calibration, they were 
in Absolute Calibration. Results suggest that, before the intervention, all students were 
close to being accurate, but that low performers were slightly more variable and thus 
less accurate. Than high performers. After the intervention (Prediction/Postdiction 2), 
both low and high performers had achieved self-evaluative accuracy, and this accuracy 
was similarly variable. 
Students’ ability to recall their previous test scores and initial performance 
predictions was critical to the current intervention, so a series of analyses was 
performed to check for the accuracy of these during the Reflection Period. Paired 
samples comparisons revealed that there were no significant differences between 
average test grades, and the average test grade reported during the Reflection Period 
intervention (p = .706; Average Test 1 Grade: M = 77.700, SD = 10.675; Average 
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Reported Test 1 Grade: M = 77.365, SD = 12.745). No significant differences were 
found between average reported Prediction 1s (M = 78.856, SD = 10.658) and actual 
Prediction 1s (M = 79.100, SD = 15.216; p = .935). These data suggest that participants 
that did complete the intervention did so faithfully, and accurately reported their 
previous grades and self-evaluations, so they may have been at least somewhat affected 
by the intervention. Note, however, that participants completed an average of less than 
3 Intervention surveys (M = 2.76, SD = 2.639) during the Reflection Period. 
Intervention and Prediction Accuracy Over Time. Feature 1 was replicated 
(t(72) = 2.755, p = .007, dz = .323), students were less confident at Postdiction 1 (M = 
75.07, SD = 15.68) than at Prediction 1 (M = 78.67, SD = 13.119). Due to poor 
participant compliance, Reflection Period survey data varied between 1 to 22 responses 
at any one time point, so paired samples comparisons were difficult. The highest 
confidence points during the Reflection Period coincided with very low response rates 
(N < 10), so the Reflection Period peak was instead found through a series of paired 
samples comparisons. Indeed, the only significant change in self-evaluations from 
Postdiction 1 to a point during the Reflection Period (Feature 2), occurred at Reflection 
Period Prediction 1 (t(17) = -4.160, p = .001, dz = -.980; M = 75.22, SD = 13.256; to M 
= 83.56, SD = 8.793). Although confidence did decrease significantly from the 
Reflection Period Peak to Postdiction 2 (Feature 3: t(16) = 4.847, p < .001, dz = 1.176; 
M = 84.35, SD = 8.366; to M = 72.41, SD = 14.689), predictions did not seem to 
become more confident from Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 (t(60) = -.422, p = .675, dz = 
-.054; M = 75.74, SD = 16.300; to M = 76.48, SD = 13.070). Furthermore, students 
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were actually less confident at Prediction 2 than at Prediction 1 (t(17) = -4.160, p = 
.001, dz = -.980; M = 75.22, SD = 13.256; to M = 83.56, SD = 8.793).  
The current results seem to align with expectations. Just a few days after their 
first test, students had begun to become more confident about their future performance. 
However, after the first intervention survey, students seemed to lose this non-adaptive 
confidence, and ceased gaining confidence for the remainder of the Reflection Period. 
Although these students did not necessarily make more accurate predictions at Test 2 
than at Test 1 (Absolute Calibration paired samples comparison: t(17) = -4.160, p = 
.001, dz = -.980; M = 75.22, SD = 13.256; to M = 83.56, SD = 8.793), they did have less 
overconfident at Test 2 than at Test 1 (Calibration paired samples comparison: t(17) = -
4.160, p = .001, dz = -.980; M = 75.22, SD = 13.256; to M = 83.56, SD = 8.793), and 
Test 2 scores were higher than Test 1 (t(17) = -4.160, p = .001, dz = -.980; M = 75.22, 
SD = 13.256; to M = 83.56, SD = 8.793). Whereas different test scores cannot be 
directly attributed to the current intervention, it is possible that the reduced confidence 
elicited by the intervention may have increased study behavior in those students that 
participated. Further research might investigate a more causal link between this type of 
intervention and study choice behavior (but see research suggesting a link between 
metacognitive confidence and study behavior: Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Metcalfe, 
2002; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b).  
Key Aspect of the Intervention. A series of regressions were run to examine 
which aspect(s) of the intervention were critical to its effects. The difference between 
Postdiction 1 and Prediction 2 was used as the dependent variable, because it described 
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the amount of confidence change students exhibited between tests. The first regression 
included only the quantity of intervention surveys successfully completed as an 
independent variable, but no significant relationship was found (F(1, 65) = .828, p = 
.366, R2 = .013). Of the students who completed Postdiction 1 and Prediction 2, only 
about half (30 of 61) successfully completed any intervention surveys, so if completion 
of at least one or more interventions did not prevent confidence change, could the 
current results be merely spurious? A second regression was run to check what, if any, 
of the intervention aspects was responsible for preventing confidence change between 
tests. Four independent variables were entered into this second analysis: quantity of 
predictions, Absolute Calibration of estimated prior test performance, Absolute 
Calibration of estimated prior prediction, and Test Performance average. Estimations of 
prior test performance and predictions were entered because they were an integral part 
of the intervention surveys. However, these items were entered as absolute calibrations, 
or the absolute value of the difference between themselves and the actual data point, 
because participants may not have been entirely accurate in their estimations or 
recollections. In other words, these items represented student’s accuracy in reporting 
their prior test performance and predictions during the intervention. Finally, average 
test performance was entered because there is evidence that higher performing students 
may be more susceptible to feedback and interventions than lower performing students 
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Of these four variables, only the Absolute Calibration of 
estimated prior test performance was significant (unstandardized 𝛽 = .900, p = .016). 
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This suggests that the accuracy with which participants reported their prior test 
performance was crucial to the effect of the intervention.  
Test Performance. A paired-samples comparison indicated that students 
obtained higher test scores after the intervention (t(62) = -2.069, p = .042, dz = .228, M 
= 76.220, SD = 11.151; to M = 78.683, SD = 13.204). A regression was run using the 
difference in test scores as a dependent variable, to check what aspect of the 
intervention, if any, could explain test-performance improvement. The difference 
between Prediction 1 and 2, quantity of predictions, Absolute Calibration of estimated 
prior test performance, Absolute Calibration of estimated prior prediction, and Test 
Performance average were each entered into a regression, and nonsignificant predictors 
were removed one-by-one until only significant factors remained. The resulting 
regression model was significant (F(2, 37) = 5.950, p = .006, R2 = .243), indicating that 
average Test Performance (t = 3.421, p = .002, Std. β = .693) and the Absolute 
Calibration of estimated prior test performance (t = -2.111, p = .042, Std. β = -.427) 
each accounted for a unique portion of test improvement. Whereas it may be 
unsurprising that higher performing students were more able to improve their test 
grades, it was promising to find that accurate recollection of one’s past test 
performance played a significant role in both preventing rising confidence, and 
improving test grades above and beyond test performance. Further investigation into 
the association between accurate performance recollection, accurate metacognition, and 
improving performance needed to determine a causal relationship. Although the change 
in test performance was not large in either number (about 2 points) or in effect size, it 
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was promising to find improvement in test performance especially after such poor 
intervention compliance. Further investigation would be needed to determine the 
consistency of this outcome, and the size of its effect under fully compliant 
circumstances. 
Factors Affecting Performance Predictions. Educational, and Motivational 
Factors were analyzed as in previous experiments (Figure 7). The results of this 
analysis were the closest to expectations across all studies. The relative influence of 
Motivational Factors seemed to be correlated with students’ self-evaluative confidence. 
Although these results are promising, because they are only one in six experiments to 
follow expected results, they may only be due to chance. 
Experiment 5 
 Experiment 4 investigated an intervention designed to prevent rising confidence 
in students between tests. Results suggested that participants who accurately recalled 
their prior test performance while estimating their future performance were less likely 
to become increasingly confident between tests. Although this intervention may have 
improved prediction accuracy and test scores, further data is required to establish the 
consistency and requirements of this outcome. Although the intervention in Experiment 
4 was not particularly involved, it seemed to produce results despite poor participant 
compliance. Could a minimalist intervention, designed to help students associate prior 
test scores to their grade predictions produce similar results? Experiment 5 investigated 
this possibility by simplifying the intervention used in Experiment 4. 
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 Methods. 
Participants. Participants in this experiment consisted of 59 university students 
taken from a cognitive psychology course in the fall of 2018. This sample size was 
limited first by the quantity of students enrolled in the course, and second by the 
quantity that consented to participate, but should still be sufficient based on the effect 
sizes and power analyses from prior studies. Demographic information was not 
collected and at the request of the instructors for Experiments 4-5. However, 
participants were of similar proportion to Experiments 1-3 in every way. This was 
regular lecture-based course for upper-level students. 
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 5 can be conceived of as an extremely 
minimalistic version of Experiment 4. Participants completed two in-class tests as part 
of their regular course schedule. Participants completed four self-evaluation surveys, 
one immediately before and after of the two tests, again described as Prediction 1/2 and 
Postdiction 1/2. The surveys were the same used in Experiments 3-4 (very similar to 
Appendix B). Between the two exams, students had their grade predictions (Prediction 
1) presented alongside their test grades using the online system normally used to 
communicate grades to students. This was the only intervention measure, and students 
completed a series of predictions alongside the next exam in their class. 
Results and Discussion. 
Procedure Check. A series of analyses were performed to check for 
overconfidence levels and appropriate manipulation conditions. In terms of Calibration, 
students were not significantly inaccurate at any self-evaluation point (p ≥ 1.01) except 
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Postdiction 1, where participants were significantly underconfident (t(43) = -3.864, p < 
.001, dz = -.583, M = -4.729, SD = 8.118). Indeed, students were underconfident 
throughout the study, potentially because test scores (test 1: M = 83.692, SD = 8.360; 
test 2: M = 84.578, SD = 7.716) were anecdotally higher than average test scores for 
the department and course level (usually closer to 77). Despite presenting 
underconfidence, the current results seem to align with expected outcomes, as 
described in the following sections. Significant Absolute Calibration inaccuracy was 
found at all self-evaluation points in the current experiment (p < .001).  
Intervention and Prediction Accuracy over Time. To evaluate the efficacy of 
the current intervention, predictions were first analyzed to check for the three features 
of the Shifting Focus effect. Students replicated prior experiments in exhibiting a 
significant decrease in confidence from Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1 (t(45) = 4.599, p < 
.001, dz = .678 M = 82.35, SD = 10.800 to M = 77.78, SD = 12.094). No Reflection 
Period Predictions were made during Experiment 5, so Features 2 and 3 could not be 
analyzed in the same way as prior studies. However, students did not become more 
confident from Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 (t(32) = -1.102, p = .279, dz = -.192, M = 
79.61, SD = 10.335 to M = 81.55, SD = 10.583) or become less confident from 
Prediction 2 to Postdiction 2 (t(35) = -.359, p = .722, dz = -.060, M = 80.97, SD = 
10.750 to M = 81.39, SD = 13.085). Students did not become significantly more 
confident between in-class tests. Further analyses corroborated these results, indicating 
that participants did not become less accurate from Postdiction 1 to Prediction 2 in 
terms of either Calibration (t(31) = -1.303, p = .202, dz = .231, M = -4.535, SD = 8.721 
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to M = -2.223, SD = 10.036) or Absolute Calibration (t(31) = -.159, p = .874, dz = .028, 
M = 7.387, SD = 6.399 to M = 7.588, SD = 6.811). 
Checking One’s Grade. The current intervention involved presenting prior 
grade predictions alongside prior test grades such that a demonstration of students’ 
prediction accuracy may have been salient whenever they thought or viewed their test 
grades. Because this information was presented online, data were gathered on how 
many times students checked their grades. Although about half of the participating 
students did not log in to view their grades (N = 24 of 52 valid data points), students 
averaged about three views per person (M = 3.06, SD = 5.177; although these data were 
positively skewed, and two participants were excluded as extreme outliers (viewed 
their grades 54+ times). Postdiction 1 was subtracted from Prediction 2 to measure the 
change over time, and ran a correlational analysis to the resulting variable with the 
amount of grade views. After the removal of outliers (two or more SD’s outside 
average in grade views or prediction change) no significant relationship was found (r = 
.064, p = .736, N = 30). 
Test Performance. A paired-samples comparison did not find higher test scores 
after the intervention for the full sample (t(55) = -1.089, p = .281, dz = .147, M = 
83.692, SD = 8.360; to M = 84.849, SD = 7.514) or for participants who checked their 
grade at least once (p = .351). Although not predicted, this outcome was not entirely 
unsurprising as the effect size, and sample size of Experiment 5 were lower than 
Experiment 4. Further investigation is necessary to determine whether a minimalistic 
intervention can help improve test performance as well as metacognitive accuracy.  





At the end of every semester, instructors and academic advisors must work with 
students who did not achieve their academic goals. Losing a scholarship, bombing a 
course, or even missing graduation, these innumerable students join the millions of 
yearly college dropouts who fail to achieve their higher education goals (data from the 
U.S. Dept. of Education). The current experiments investigated one of the possible 
causes for these outcomes: a tendency for people to become more confident between 
tests, potentially leading to overconfidence and underperformance in the classroom.  
When people predict how well they will perform a task, they often exhibit 
overconfidence (Bol et al., 2005; Foster et al., 2016; Hacker et al., 2008; Miller & 
Geraci, 2011a, 2011b; Nietfeld et al., 2005). In students, this overconfidence has been 
prevalently observed and linked to low test performance (Everson & Tobias, 1998; 
Kelemen et al., 2007; Shepperd, 1993). In response, researchers have investigated a 
variety of interventions designed to improve student’s self-evaluative accuracy, with 
inconsistent success (Hacker et al., 2008; Foster et al., 2016; Nietfeld et al., 2005, 
2006). Ideally, interventions for improving self-evaluative accuracy should have 
staying power, that is, they should help students improve their self-evaluations over 
multiple tests, and ideally, across multiple semesters or domains of knowledge. One 
problem with these interventions is our limited understanding of the way in which 
these self-evaluations are made. How do students go about predicting or postdicting 
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their test performance? And what circumstances or mental strategies lead students to 
potentially harmful overconfidence? Going further, the human mind is extremely adept 
at learning, and the proper evaluation of behavioral results should be key to this 
learning ability, so why would people exhibit a tendency towards overconfident, 
inaccurate self-evaluations? 
I propose that overconfidence during performance predictions may actually be 
an adaptive mental habit that allows for both accurate self-assessment after a test, as 
well as sufficient confidence in one’s abilities to try again during the next test. Imagine 
a novice juggler, who fumbles his first performance. Should this person evaluate 
themselves accurately, they would correctly identify their incompetence, but also lose 
the confidence to attempt a second performance in the future, and give up practicing, 
believing themselves a failure. Should the person incorrectly evaluate themselves to be 
a master (ignoring their results) they might have the confidence to continue performing 
but may neglect further practice, leading to a different failure state of perpetual 
incompetence. It may be then, that a fluctuating level of confidence is necessary for 
people to improve themselves, to prepare for future performance despite past failures. 
As time passes, people may shift the focus of their self-evaluations from past failures, 
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Research Questions and Summarized Results  
Why are test-performance predictions inaccurate and often overconfident? 
Can the pattern of prediction accuracy fluctuation found in the preliminary data 
(the Shifting Focus effect) be replicated? The current experiments provide evidence 
for a fluctuating, zig-zagging self-evaluative confidence level both in the laboratory 
and in the classroom (e.g., Figure 4). These fluctuations present three distinct and 
consistent features: a decrease in confidence from predictions to postdictions for an 
initial test (Feature 1: Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1), an increase in confidence from an 
initial test to a point before a subsequent test (Feature 2: Postdiction 1 to Reflection 
Period Peak), and a final drop in confidence from a point between two tests, to after the 
second exam (Feature 3: Reflection Period Peak to Postdiction 2). These three features 
comprise a Shifting Focus effect, and were replicated across Experiments 1-3. 
Additional comparisons may be made by comparing predictions for two tests, which 
might exhibit no change, and therefore indicate students did not learn anything from 
taking the first test. One may also compare postdictions from one test to predictions 
from a subsequent test, which might exhibit increased confidence, and indicate that 
metacognitive learning from one test was somehow lost by the next one. These 
comparisons were considered secondary because they may be more conservative and or 
inconsistent than the three primary features. They may be more conservative or 
inconsistent because they require increases in confidence to increase to the same or a 
greater level than confidence before the first test, whereas Features 2 and 3 are more 
liberal because they can detect any increase in confidence during the Reflection Period. 
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 Across Experiments 1-3, participants made more confident and less accurate 
predictions than postdictions, suggesting that they learned something about themselves 
by taking a test. However, self-evaluations were no different before the second test 
than before the first test, indicating that participants somehow lost the accuracy 
improvement gained from taking the first exam. Experiments 1-3 also showed that 
people incrementally raised their self-evaluative confidence between tests, until 
arriving at the same confidence level they had before the first test.  
Are these results robust to the particular prediction type (absolute vs 
percentile)? The current experiment focused on absolute predictions, or self-
evaluations where one estimates a grade. Another way to evaluate oneself is to estimate 
one’s performance in terms of percentile ranking. Although percentile predictions 
followed similar patterns to absolute predictions, percentile predictions were not 
consistently of greater or lesser magnitude than absolute predictions. These results may 
be unsurprising as existing data suggest that percentile predictions may be more 
variable, and potentially more difficult to successfully produce than absolute 
predictions (Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2014; Tirso et al., 2019). In addition, a major quality 
of the Reflection Period (the time between tests) was that participants were encouraged 
to think about their future test performance in terms of absolute estimates. It may be 
that shifts in percentile evaluations would follow from asking people to think about 
their future performance in terms of percentile ranking as well.  
What factors affect these fluctuations? Prior research shows that motivational 
information, such as the ideal grades, is associated to greater confidence in self-
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evaluations (Saenz et al., 2017; Serra & Demarree, 2016). Contrarily, educational 
factors like past test performance should be related to better accuracy, because past test 
performance is predictive of future test performance (Jensen & Barron, 2014). 
Although the fluctuation of confidence across multiple tests paints a slightly more 
complete picture of self-evaluative confidence, it does not inherently describe what 
mental processes are behind it. So, the current experiments investigated whether these 
fluctuations could be explained by changes in the factors one focuses on when making 
self-evaluations. Figure 7 summarizes these data. Results did not reveal any consistent 
trend in the relationship of motivational factors, educational factors, and self-
evaluations. Despite this, it is difficult to rule of the role of these factors entirely, given 
the findings of prior research. The current investigation into these factors was limited 
in several ways. Data on these factors was not gathered during Reflection Periods, so 
analyses for these time points was flawed. Furthermore, the prior research involving 
these factors mainly focused on in-class studies, and should only be valid for 
experiments without interventions, conditions that were only met in Experiment 3. 
Although there are many available methods for assessing the contributing factors of 
self-evaluative judgements, there were very few instances of data where these methods 
may be compared. Further research may focus on using validated ways of measuring 
motivational, educational, another factors to examine their relationship to self-
evaluations.  
The educational factors analyzed in the current experiments may not have been 
entirely reasonable. These educational factors involved students’ studying habits and 
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class attendance, information that seems related to grade predictions, but may not 
necessarily be, especially in a laboratory setting. Furthermore, the data from the current 
Shifting Focus effect replications indicates that confidence changes as time elapses 
from a prior test, so instances where participants may have chosen to study, or attend 
class were not involved. Instead, further study may focus on the fluency, and 
recollection of past test performance and feedback, information that must have been 
available to participants across all current experiments (at least in the form of self-
feedback during testing). Other possible explanations for the Shifting Focus effect are 
further described in the “Connecting the Shifting Focus effect to Existing Literature” 
section. 
An additional set of items, Anchoring Factors, was included in the analyses of 
this experiment to observe the extent to which self-evaluations might be made 
arbitrarily. These items were not designed to observe whether participants made their 
self-evaluations randomly, but instead, to observe the extent to which reasonable, 
though impersonal information, like perceived class-test-averages, might inform or 
anchor self-evaluations. Although it makes sense to base one’s self-evaluation around 
the class average, that number is not necessarily associated to one’s own performance 
level, and may lead participants to make metacognitive mistakes. Although the current 
experiments were, at best, only an initial investigation of Anchoring Factors, they were 
found to be consistently strongly related to self-evaluations to the extent that they may 
have overshadowed other factor groups. Further investigations might research the 
extent to which self-evaluations are made arbitrarily, and the circumstances that may 
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affect or elicit anchoring behavior in self-evaluations and other metacognitive 
judgements.  
Are the answers to these questions consistent across different laboratory 
and applied settings? Are changes in prediction accuracy more strongly related to 
the amount of time between predictions, or the amount of thought put into those 
predictions? Figure 8 summarizes the effect sizes of the three main Shifting Focus 
features, as well as the difference between Prediction 1 and Prediction 2. In brief, the 
features of the Shifting Focus effect were replicated in both laboratory and classroom 
studies. Interestingly, the Shifting Focus effect (particularly Feature 2) was most 
pronounced in the classroom setting, with the longest Reflection Period, and the fewest 
Reflection Period Predictions. Additionally, it was difficult to say that either time or 
thought (amount of predictions) was more impactful. Although longer periods of time, 
and fewer predictions had greater effect sizes, these outcomes had two caveats. First, 
the Reflection periods occurred during the in-class experiments, so that may 
confabulate results. Second, Confidence seemed to peak somewhere between 2-7 days 
into the reflection period. However, this rising period may be variable based on the 
reflection period size, as a sort of peak and plateau was reached in experiment 1. 
Furthermore, data were not gathered daily in experiments 2-3, so the exact “reflection 
period peak” cannot be determined with the current data. Implications and possible 
explanations for these outcomes are further discussed in the effect size comparisons 
section below. 
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Can interventions to improve self-evaluations across multiple tests be 
developed based on what we know about the causes of inaccuracy in predictions? 
Can such interventions be implemented with minimal interference in the 
classroom? Experiments 4-5 investigated this question, and their evidence suggests 
that increases in confidence between tests can be prevented by the presentation, recall, 
and/or association of prior test scores to future performance predictions. Of note, 
results suggested that the key factor in these interventions was the pairing of accurate 
prior tests results to prior or future self-evaluations. In other words, people who 
incorrectly recalled their test scores as being higher than they actually were, did not 
benefit from thinking about their test scores as an intervention, and went on to become 
more confident (See also the discussion on discounting feedback in following 
sections). Interestingly, the minimalistic intervention in Experiment 5 may have 
avoided this issue, by directly pairing past test performance with past self-evaluations: 
students who checked their grades were required to notice the accuracy of their 
predictions. Experiments 4-5 were severely limited by participant compliance, and 
many of the analyses therein may be underpowered, so further study and replication is 
needed to verify their results and implications.  
Do such interventions interact with the underlying factors in expected 
ways? As in Experiments 1-3, analyses of the Motivational and Educational Factors 
involved in self-evaluations across Experiments 4-5 did not yield either consistent or 
expected results. Summarized in Figure 7, regression analyses for Experiment 4 
seemed to follow exactly hypothesized trends: participant’s self-evaluations seemed to 
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be more motivationally oriented when they were more confident, and more 
educationally oriented when they were less confident. However, the same analysis in 
Experiment 5 yielded an exactly inverse relationship. It is difficult to make any 
inferences about these factors based on these data, though it is interesting to note that 
the most dramatic changes in these factors occurred in Experiment 4, and aligned with 
expected results. 
Did the interventions in Experiments 4-5 improve test performance? Although 
such an outcome would be ideal, it is difficult to make this conclusion. No evidence of 
such a change was found in Experiment 5, and although there was improvement in 
Experiment 4, the improvement was small. Still, being applied studies, it is difficult to 
interpret data from these experiments definitively. Results may have been entirely due 
to differences in test difficulty, rather than intervention conditions. It was promising to 
find test score recollection accuracy was a consistently important factor in Experiment 
4, both for prediction accuracy, and for test score improvement. Some studies have 
found that more accurately reported SAT/GPA scores are associated with higher 
academic performance (Everson & Tobias, 1998; Kelemen et al., 2007; Thiede, 1999; 
Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 2003). These data may therefore support a Memory 
for Past Test performance account of shifting metacognitive confidence (further 
discussed below). 
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Connecting the Shifting Focus Effect to Existing Literature 
Accuracy vs. Confidence. 
To oversimplify the Shifting Focus effect, people seem to become less 
confident after a test of their abilities, but regain that confidence before the next test. 
Parts of this effect has been observed and evidenced in many ways, and many of these 
related effects focus on the accuracy of self-evaluations instead of their absolute level 
of confidence. For example, the Postdiction Superiority effect proposes that 
postdictions are more accurate than predictions when estimating one’s knowledge after 
reading a given text (Pierce & Smith, 2001). The Underconfidence with Practice effect 
(Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2002; See also the Memory for Past Test heuristic: MPT, Finn & 
Metcalfe, 2007) focuses more so on memory, and purports that people become 
underconfident after memory tests involving feedback. Effects like these describe a 
circumstance where people become more accurate in their self-evaluations after being 
tested, often accompanied by a reduction in confidence relative to performance (i.e., 
from overconfidence towards underconfidence).  
The current Shifting Focus effect does not focus on self-evaluative accuracy 
(Calibration or Absolute Calibration), but instead on how people to evaluate 
themselves across time (changes in confidence). Although over- or under-confidence 
may often be associated to lower and higher metacognitive accuracy respectively, the 
two items are not necessarily linked (e.g., if everyone is underconfident, higher 
confidence would be more accurate). This distinction was evidenced by the fact that the 
Shifting Focus effect did not seem to interact with test performance. For example, 
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lower and higher performing participants were affected equally by the three Features of 
the Shifting Focus effect, and during an intervention to eliminate the Shifting Focus 
effect (Experiment 4), test performance levels were not a moderating factor.  
Much metacognitive research has focused on lower and higher performing 
students because lower performing students tend to exhibit greater overconfidence, and 
less self-evaluative accuracy (Bol et al., 2005; Hacker et al., 2008; Miller & Geraci, 
2011a, 2011b; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Saenz et al., 2017). Many researchers have 
focused on the accuracy of self-evaluations because it presents a readily apparent goal: 
achieving accuracy. However, because the current experiments showed that confidence 
may change irrespective of self-evaluative accuracy, and because the current and prior 
studies show that self-evaluations may be affected by anchoring (Ferrel & McGoey, 
1980; Burson et al., 2006; Klayman et al., 1999), future investigations may seek to 
interpret existing metacognitive research in terms of simple self-evaluations or 
predictions, instead of focusing on accuracy. Though I do not propose that accuracy 
based accounts are inaccurate, I do propose they may be incomplete2. 
                                                 
2 Theories and hypotheses like the Postdiction Superiority Effect and the Underconfidence with Practice 
Effect specify different reasons for change in self-evaluative accuracy, but do not describe how self-
evaluative behavior changes, and instead focus on the level of function or dysfunction of metacognitive 
behavior. By analyzing changes in self-evaluative accuracy (such as by Calibration or Gamma 
Correlations) instead of overall confidence level, one must necessarily bundle two different data points: 
people’s confidence and people’s performance scores. Some of the research in this area involves 
multiple testing trials on the exact same material, which may result in greater changes in test 
performance than self-evaluations. In other words, effects like the Underconfidence with Practice Effect 
might rely, at least partially, on a resistance to change in self-evaluations, where performance over 
multiple trials improved more drastically than people were willing to change their predictions (e.g. 
Figure 9, from Koriat 1997). These types of apparently inaccurate metacognitive judgements may 
therefore be considered statistical artefacts by some (i.e., Kelemen et al., 2007) or a form of inaccuracy 
through anchoring. 
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An interesting comparison one may make to these theories of metacognitive 
judgements is to consider how certain pieces of information affect self-evaluations and 
their accuracy. For example, one explanation for the Underconfidence with Practice 
Effect is that people become more metacognitively accurate, and less confident, as they 
are made more aware of their past test performance (the Memory for Past Test 
Performance Effect). Indeed, such an explanation fits with other accuracy changing 
outcomes. It seems reasonable that postdictions might be superior because when 
making a postdiction, people have just experienced a test, so their memory for their 
past test performance should be fresh and salient (even if that memory relies on self-
evaluated performance during the test, i.e., “how well you felt you did”). Feature 2 of 
the Shifting Focus Effect may therefore result from the opposite condition. As mental 
processes work, or as time passes, memory for past test performance may deteriorate. 
However, there is evidence that people, and students in particular, do remember their 
past test scores accurately (e.g., Study 4), or are at least somewhat aware of their prior 
test scores (Miller & Geraci, 2011a). Instead, it may be that the fluency, or saliency, or 
mental connections between past test performance and future performance may weaken 
as a function of something that happens during the time between tests, the Reflection 
Period. Indeed, the interventions in Experiments 4-5 may have been effective 
specifically because they strengthened this connection or fluency during the Reflection 
Period. Further investigation is required to ascertain whether the mechanism causing 
these two types of effects (Features 1 and 2)can be attributed to the same broader 
concept. 
 70   
 
Effect Size Comparisons.  
Increases in self-evaluative confidence between tests were found across 
multiple settings in Experiments 1-3. Experiment 1 gave participants 10 minutes to 
make 10 predictions in a laboratory environment, Experiment 2 gave participants one 
week to make 7 predictions in a laboratory/home environment, and Experiment 3 gave 
participants four weeks to make 4 predictions in a classroom environment. Although 
Experiments 1-3 each found significant changes in grade predictions for all three of the 
features hereto described, the effect sizes of these features may help us understand how 
they work. Figure 8 outlines the effect sizes for Experiments 1-5 and shows a few 
interesting comparisons. The first Feature, a decrease in confidence from Prediction 1 
to Postdiction 1 seems greater in Experiments 1 and 2 than in Experiments 3, 4, or 5. 
This difference seems to be most likely a demand characteristic of these experiments as 
the test used in Experiments 1-2 (the laboratory studies) was made purposefully 
difficult to elicit greater overconfidence, and so should result in a greater change in 
predictions. Additionally, Experiments 3-5 were performed in the classroom, a setting 
where participants would naturally have a better idea of the test difficulty and content. 
The second feature of these experiments was more interesting, however, as it 
encapsulated the rise of self-evaluative confidence during the Reflection Period, 
specifically from Postdiction 1 to the highest Reflection Period confidence point. The 
effect size of Feature 2 seemed to become larger from Experiments 1 to 3, and the 
specific conditions of those experiments might explain this outcome.  
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I propose three possibilities. First, Experiments 1 to 3.2 each involved 
incrementally longer Reflection Periods, and fewer self-evaluations to make during the 
Reflection Period, so it may be that time is a driving force behind increases in self-
evaluative confidence, and that the amount of predictions is less important. It may be 
that people become more self-confident as more time passes but not necessarily as they 
made more predictions or thought harder on their predictions (but see Buratti & 
Allwood, 2012, 2013). However, this explanation is flawed as in Experiment 2 and 3.2, 
self-evaluative confidence hit its peak early on in the Reflection Period (Experiment 2: 
day 2; Experiment 3.2: Week 1), suggesting that the length of time that passes is 
important, but only as long as people are given at least 2-7 days to consider their 
judgements, with longer periods of time either lowering or not affecting confidence 
during the Reflection Period. At best, this explanation can explain why Experiment 1 
has the lowest effect size, but not why Experiment 3.2 has a higher effect size than 
Experiment 2. 
Second, it may be that the confidence changes between tests are most strongly 
affected by the importance and motivational circumstances of those tests. That is, 
Experiment 3.2 was conducted in a classroom, and a motivational account of the 
Shifting Focus effect would expect changes in confidence to be caused a greater focus 
on motivations when making self-evaluations. Put simply, because participants in 
Experiment 3.2 were students, they may have experienced greater motivation to feel 
confident that participants in Experiments 1-2, leading them to experience a greater 
shift in confidence during their Reflection Period. Although the effect sizes of Feature 
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3 seem slightly difference between Experiments 1-2 and Experiment 3, such 
differences may be explained by the difference in Feature 2. That is, if participants’ 
confidence rose more in Experiment 3 during the Reflection Period (Feature 2), then 
they have more room to lose confidence after their test (Feature 3). But this explanation 
may also be flawed as the analysis of factors in the previous experiments has provided 
minimal (at best) evidence for an explanation based on changes in the motivational or 
educational nature of self-evaluations. Furthermore, Experiments 4-5 did not seem to 
show these motivational differences either. Although prior research does seem to 
suggest a significant role of Motivational Factors in the inaccuracy of performance 
predictions, it may be that this role is in addition to, or aside from changes in prediction 
accuracy over time. Although this explanation might explain the difference between 
Experiments 2 and 3.2, the analysis of prediction Factors in the previous and the 
following results sections does not seem to support this explanation (but see following 
discussion on how different types of Motivational Factors may be important).  
Third, and potentially most parsimonious, it may be that variance in predictions 
was simply lesser in the classroom, resulting in a greater apparent impact of prediction 
change. Generally, laboratory studies are performed because they help eliminate 
unnecessary variability in data, but the current experimental procedures may have 
actually elicited a more variable dependent measure in the laboratory setting. Indeed, 
the standard deviations for self-evaluations in Experiment 3.2 were numerically smaller 
than those of Experiments 1-2, potentially because they involved real students and 
tests. It seems reasonable that a prediction for a test you have studies for would be less 
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arbitrary than a prediction for a test you are unfamiliar with, such as those we 
administered in the laboratory. Further investigation would be needed to confirm this 
difference in variability, so it is difficult to conclude that the “artificiality” of the prior 
studies can be used to explain the differences in effect size between them. Although 
there may be other explanations for these differences in effect size, it also seems 
reasonable that a combination of the above mentioned may be the best explanation. It is 
also important to note that interpreting differences in effect size from a single set of 
experiments may be premature. 
Still, effect sizes of the features in Experiments 4-5 may corroborate these and 
other interpretations of the current studies. The effect size of Experiment 4, Feature 2 
fell somewhere between Experiments 2 and 3.23. This result may be unsurprising 
because, although participants did have a Reflection Period of at least 2-7 days, and 
would have been affected by the motivation of their applied setting, most participants 
did not much of the intervention procedure for Experiment 4. One might consider that a 
high and significant effect size for Features 2-3 in Experiment 4 indicates a failed 
intervention. Why did Experiment 4 have a Feature 2, despite having an apparently 
successful intervention? While, yes, confidence reached a “peak” in Experiment 4, it 
also gradually declined before the following test. Any confidence gained in the first 
week of the Reflection Period, was lost by the time of the next test. Furthermore, the 
negative effect size of the Postdiction 1 – Prediction 2 comparison suggests a 
successful prevention (or maybe quelling?) of rising confidence during the Reflection 
Period. Indeed, the Reflection Period Peak for Experiment 4 occurred, as in 
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Experiments 2-3, approximately 2-7 days after Postdiction 1, due to the self-initiated 
nature of the intervention used therein. It may be that the effect size of Experiment 4, 
Feature 2 shows how students reached a peak level of metacognitive confidence before 
the intervention began to affect them (as the first of intervention procedures would 
have been completed, at best, just moments before that peak confidence was reported). 
Motivation as a Reason for Confidence. 
A number of literatures have connected motivation and confidence. Some of 
these have already been described in supporting hypotheses and expectations for the 
current studies, but still others can aid in interpreting the current results. For example, 
an externalization account of overconfidence (Hacker & Bol, 2004; Bol et al., 2005; 
Hacker et al., 2008a, 2008b) states that lower performing students are overconfident 
because they blame their poor performance on outside factors. Evidence indicates that 
low performers are more likely to endorse statements like, “The test didn’t really cover 
the things we covered in class” than “I didn’t study the right things in the right way.” 
These studies propose that because lower performing students attribute poor 
performance to external factors, those students tend to discount feedback, like prior test 
scores, leading them to maintain overconfidence on later tests. This self-fulfilling cycle 
of poor performance, and discounted feedback has been suggested and evidenced in a 
number of ways, such as the external locus of control literature (e.g., Seligman, 1991), 
and the Mindset literature (Dweck, 2008; See also Elliott & Dweck, 1988 for a look at 
connecting goals and motivation and Martin, Bostwick, Collie, & Tarbetsky, 2017 for a 
review). Relatedly, the Memory for Past Test performance literature (i.e., MPT, Finn & 
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Metcalfe, 2007) proposes that people become more accurate in their metacognitive 
judgements (and eventually “underconfident with practice”, i.e., Koriat & Ma’ayan, 
2002) as their memory for past test performances and feedback is reinforced or made 
fluent through repetition and framing. Together, these findings suggest that a forgetting 
or discounting of feedback explanation can produce overconfidence.  
How do these ideas fit in with current findings? On one hand, it is difficult to 
say that the current entirely data can accommodate a simple discounting explanation 
because Experiments 1-2 showed a gradual increase in confidence, so participants 
probably did not ignore their prior test performance outright. On the other hand, one 
cannot completely ignore the possibility that people discount negative feedback. It 
seems possible that people might discount negative feedback over a period of time, 
letting the “sting” of failure fade away. Data from Experiment 4, where only people 
who accurately remembered their prior test scores improved their metacognition, also 
supports the notion of a discounting hypothesis. Indeed, because the motivational and 
educational factors gathered as part of the current dissertation did not load onto 
confidence change consistently, a gradual discounting of feedback might be a better 
explanation. 
It is important to note strong parallels between the Self-efficacy /-regulation 
literature, the currently described motivational account, and the Shifting Focus effect. 
Self-efficacy encompasses a wide range of ideas, and has been described as, “people’s 
beliefs in their ability to influence events that affect their lives” (Bandura, 2010, pp. 1) 
as well as, “judgements of one’s capabilities to do [an] academic task” (Pintrich, 1999, 
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pp. 462). Despite the wide-ranging ideas encompassed by Self-efficacy, it is clear that 
it should inform discourse on students’ confidence in their learning. People with high 
levels of Self-efficacy tend to “approach” difficult tasks, and attribute their own failure 
to poor preparation or effort. In other words, people with better self-efficacy tend 
towards metacognitive accuracy, and people with worse self-efficacy tend towards 
overconfidence. Another parallel is that poor self-efficacy may be associated to a 
maladapted form of motivations that encourage one to focus on optimistic possibilities 
(Bandura, 2010).  
Self-regulation focuses on the extent to which people are able to regulate 
aspects of their learning, and encompasses the choices students make about studying, 
as well as how they make those choices. For example, research into Self-regulation has 
found a number of “best practices” for providing students with feedback (Nicol & 
Macfarlane-Dick, 2006). These suggestions have focused on encouraging and 
improving Self-reflection, such as performing self-assessments that seem to mirror the 
grade predictions participants completed in the current dissertation. Whereas 
Experiments 1-3 asked participants to focus on prior test performance, it may instead 
be beneficial to encourage students to reflect on their current learning during the time 
between tests (i.e., Nietfeld et al., 2006). By focusing on current learning, motivational 
biases (desired grades and/or externalizing) may also be avoided, resulting in more 
accurate metacognition (See also Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994; Steadman, 1998). 
  





Students are known to be consistently overconfident in their self-evaluations or 
metacognition about their future test performance (Bol, et al., 2005). This difference 
between students’ self-evaluations, and their actual performance (termed calibration) 
may be critically harmful to students as it may lead them to underprepare for exams. 
Many investigators have designed interventions aimed at improving students’ 
calibration, with the ultimate goal of improving students’ test performance. 
Unfortunately, these interventions have had inconsistent success, and have not elicited 
lasting improvement (Hacker et al., 2008). Further, these interventions may be limited 
by a poor understanding of the causes of overconfidence in students (Saenz et al., 
2017). 
My preliminary data showed that student’s grade predictions may rise between 
tests, without any new information being learned, so people may be Shifting the Focus 
of their grade predictions during the time between tests (Figure 2). Furthermore, 
recently published evidence shows that students make overconfident predictions at 
least in part because they use optimistic, motivationally oriented information instead of 
realistic academically based information (Saenz et al., 2017). In combination, these 
findings suggest a Shifting Focus effect may be causing overconfident performance 
estimations, and that this Shifting Focus phenomena may be associated to motivational 
biases. The current experiments replicated this Shifting Focus effect, explored the 
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possibility of a motivational explanation, and tested interventions targeting 
overconfidence, by preventing Shifting Focus effects. 
Experiments 1-3 replicated the preliminary data, showing that people become 
more confident in their self-evaluations during the period between tests. These results 
were robust to a number of circumstances, and were found both in and out of the 
classroom, as well as over periods of time ranging from minutes to weeks. Although 
results did not suggest that greater confidence was associated to a greater motivational 
bias and a weaker influence of educational information, other possible explanations for 
the features of the Shifting Focus Effect seemed to be reinforced by the data. For 
example, two interventions (Experiments 4-5) showed that reminding students of their 
prior test grades and connecting that information to self-evaluations could successfully 
prevent increases in self-evaluative confidence between tests. It may therefore be that 
the time between tests evokes a process, wherein people become more confident in 
their future test performance by disassociating (or discounting) past test performance 
from self-evaluations. Such a process may be unsurprising and adaptive because it 
would allow people to evaluate themselves accurately, and maybe even pessimistically 
after a test or performance, but become more confident over time so that they can try 
again in the future. In apparent corroboration of this possibility, rises in confidence 
seemed to peak about 2 days after an initial test, a process not-unlike the activation and 
return to baseline of ions in a neuron. It may be that people are normally confident to a 
certain degree, such that they are willing to attempt tests of their knowledge or ability. 
Taking these tests or doing these performances might jolt them out of this confidence, 
 79   
 
like an electrical impulse in a neuron. Similarly the resulting state may be imbalanced, 
and like the ions in a neuron, people might naturally become more confident until they 
are ready to fire again (i.e., take another test). Unfortunately for delayed-result 
behavior, the same confidence that allows one to re-attempt a test, might dissuade one 
from practicing for that test; if a person feels they are prepared to perform a task, why 
would they increase their preparatory behavior?  
These results may have some major implications for metacognitive research, 
particularly as it relates to education. First, the expected results may require future 
investigations into metacognition to consider that overconfidence is not caused by 
faulty metacognition, but an adaptive form of motivated optimism. For example, 
existing theories explaining inaccurate metacognition such as the unskilled and 
unaware theory (a.k.a. the Dunning-Kruger theory), must either be amended to include 
evidence for a Shifting Focus effect in metacognitive judgements, or somehow account 
for changes in self-evaluations over time. Further intervention investigations may need 
to pay attention to the time in which interventions are presented, in addition to their 
design. This is not to say that the proposed intervention designs may be the only way to 
improve calibration in students. However, future interventions may also need to first 
prevent a shift towards using motivational information, before attempting to improve 
self-evaluation efficacy in other ways.  
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APPENDIX A 
LOGICAL REASONING EXAM SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 
Questions 1–2 
A company employee generates a series of five-digit product codes in accordance with the 
following rules: 
The codes use the digits 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, and no others. Each digit occurs exactly once in any 
code. The second digit has a value exactly twice that of the first digit. 
The value of the third digit is less than the value of the fifth digit. 
 
1. If the last digit of an acceptable product code is 1, it must be true that the 
(A) first digit is 2 
(B) second digit is 0 
(C) third digit is 3 
(D) fourth digit is 4 
(E) fourth digit is 0 
 
2. Which one of the following must be true about any acceptable product code? 
(A) The digit 1 appears in some position before the digit 2. 
(B) The digit 1 appears in some position before the digit 3. 
(C) The digit 2 appears in some position before the digit 3. 
(D) The digit 3 appears in some position before the digit 0. 
(E) The digit 4 appears in some position before the digit 3. 
 
Question 3 
3. Situation: Someone living in a cold climate buys a winter coat that is stylish but not warm in 
order to appear sophisticated. Analysis: People are sometimes willing to sacrifice sensual 
comfort or pleasure for the sake of appearances. The analysis provided for the situation above 
is most appropriate for which one of the following situations? 
(A) A person buys an automobile to commute to work even though public 
transportation is quick and reliable. 
(B) A parent buys a car seat for a young child because it is more colorful and more 
comfortable for the child than the other car seats on the market, though no safer. 
(C) A couple buys a particular wine even though their favorite wine is less expensive 
and better tasting because they think it will impress their dinner guests. 
(D) A person sets her thermostat at a low temperature during the winter because she is 
concerned about the environmental damage caused by using fossil fuels to heat her 
home. 
(E) An acrobat convinces the circus that employs him to purchase an expensive outfit 
for him so that he can wear it during his act to impress the audience. 
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APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE PREDICTION SHEET 
 
Prediction Sheet 1 
Please answer all questions as honestly and accurately as possible. Please answer questions 1-4 with a percentage (NOT a 
letter) between 0% and 100%. 
1. What grade do you think you will receive on this test? _____________% 
2. What is your goal to earn on this test? ____________% 
3. What do you think will be the average grade on this test? __________% 
4. Compared to the rest of the participants, I think I will perform better than _________% of the participants. (e.g. If you 
consider yourself average, you should indicate 50%, if you think you are very above average, you may say 90%) 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
5. I based my grade predictions on my academic background 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8    Strongly Agree 
6. I based my predictions on my preparation or familiarity with this kind of exam 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8    Strongly Agree 
7. I based my predictions on my prior performance on this type of exam 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8    Strongly Agree 
8. I based my predictions on my prior academic performance 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8    Strongly Agree 
9. I based my predictions on the lowest grade I would be happy with on this test 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8    Strongly Agree 
10. I based my predictions on my ideal grade (considering my individual efforts for this test). 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8    Strongly Agree 
11. I based my predictions on what I consider to be an “okay” or “acceptable” grade 










Descriptive statistics for experiment 1. 
  
Calibration 
  Prediction 1 Postdiction 1 Prediction 2  Postdiction 2 
Performance Quartiles n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) 
1 46 52.50(16.32) 47 26.00(24.10) 47 37.36(24.13) 47 31.19(19.74) 
2 39 38.41(15.03) 39 18.33(19.41) 39 26.59(19.66) 38 20.34(18.81) 
3 42 33.02(11.79) 42 10.50(16.97) 42 18.74(18.16) 41 11.24(18.90) 
4 36 21.03(14.91) 36 4.31(15.86) 36 6.28(20.82) 36 2.44(18.27) 
Average 163 37.16(18.43) 164 15.45(21.12) 164 23.21(23.65) 162 17.21(21.70) 
Absolute Calibration 
 Prediction 1 Postdiction 1 Prediction 2 Postdiction 2 
Performance Quartiles n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) 
1 46 52.50(16.32) 47 28.98(20.33) 47 38.77(21.75) 47 32.17(18.06) 
2 39 38.41(15.03) 39 21.92(15.11) 39 29.05(15.68) 38 23.50(14.54) 
3 42 33.02(11.79) 42 15.50(12.45) 42 22.07(13.80) 41 17.10(13.68) 
4 36 23.25(11.00) 36 13.47(9.17) 36 18.78(10.55) 36 14.67(10.89) 




Individual difference data for calibration across experiment 1 as M(SD). 




















18 101 -11.093 (11.992) 
28.168  
(15.31) 36.119 (16.693) 14.158 (20.483) 23.663 (22.781) 16.396 (21.313) 
19 41 -11.735 (12.785) 30.661 (18.027) 42.550 (20.633) 20.781 (23.837) 24.707 (24.502) 21.300 (22.216) 
20 10 -12.721 (11.717) 28.150 (16.730) 39.200 (15.483) 18.500 (13.754) 28.300 (18.227) 21.500 (15.995) 
21 7 -9.082 (14.011) 27.571 (12.269) 25.000 (22.730) 13.000 (15.853) 17.143 (25.635) 10.714 (22.253) 
22 5 
4.166  










Male 49 -11.973 (14.595) 31.075 (15.674) 34.878 (20.579) 12.755 (22.617) 22.899 (27.371) 14.833 (23.180) 





Caucasian 98 -10.511 (11.458) 27.236 (15.075) 35.979 (15.992) 15.776 (19.626) 23.663 (20.707) 17.975 (23.177) 
Hispanic 40 -12.754 (13.689) 32.464 (16.400) 41.325 (18.821) 18.800 (22.243) 26.000 (24.999) 17.975 (23.177) 





Generation 28 -10.263 (12.465) 27.852 (16.010) 39.929 (25.690) 14.893 (20.993) 24.429 (24.619) 13.286 (22.213) 
Non-First-




Summarized results for experiment 2. 

























































































Average predictions and scores across thirteen exams over a university semester. 
 
Note: Reprinted from “Even after thirteen class exams, students are still overconfident: The role of memory for past exam performance in 




Preliminary data: repeated predictions intervention between two exams. 
 
Note: These data were gathered as part of Saenz, Geraci, and Tirso (2019). Predictions rose significantly from the postdiction, to the tenth 











Performance predictions across experiment 1. 
 





Experiment 1: Summary of expected results. 
Summary of expected findings for Experiment 1-3 across tests and Reflection Period. Predictions are expressed as grade percentages. 
Educational, Motivational, and Anchoring Factors are expressed in terms of percentage of explained variance accounted for, when 




Calibration and explanatory factors across experiment 1. 
 
Summary of results from Experiment 1. Calibration uses the left vertical axis and shows average performance prediction accuracy across 
Experiment 1, with perfect accuracy at 0, and more positive numbers indicating greater overconfidence. Educational, Anchoring, and 
Motivational Regression Factors use the right vertical axis, and show the explanatory power for each factor group (R2change) using each 
self estimation point (horizontal axis) as its dependent variable. Factors were only surveyed at Prediction 1/2 and Postdiction 1/2, so 




Motivational and educational factors’ relative Association to self-evaluations. 
 
Self-evaluations use the left vertical axis and show self-evaluative confidence at different points throughout Experiments 1-3. Motivation 
– Education uses the right vertical axis, and shows the explanatory power of the Motivational Factor group (R2) minus that of the 
Educational Factor Group for explaining self-evaluations using regressions. Motivational and Educational Factors were regressed on self-
evaluations in two separate analyses. More positive right-axis values indicate more motivationally based self-evaluations, while more 
negative numbers indicate more educationally based self-evaluations. Zero indicates equally motivationally and educationally based self-
evaluations. Experiments 4-5 involved an intervention, between Test 1 and Test 2. No Reflection Period self-evaluations were gathered 




Effect size comparison for prediction changes across studies. 
 
A comparison of effect sizes for the change in self-evaluative confidence across Experiments 1-3. Feature 1 compares participants’ 
confidence before and after the first test (Prediction 1 to Postdiction 1). Feature 2 compares confidence from Postdiction 1 to the highest 
confidence point in the Reflection Period, this was the 9th judgement in Experiment 1, the 2nd day in Experiment 2, and the 1st week in 
Experiment 3.2. Data for Experiment 3.1 were omitted due to poor participant compliance. Feature 3 compared the highest Reflection 
Period Point to Postdiction 2. Experiment 1 lasted 10 minutes and had 10 Reflection Period Predictions, Experiment 2 lasted 1 week and 
had 7 Reflection Period Predictions, and Experiment 3.2 lasted 1 month and had 4 Reflection Period Predictions. Experiments 1-2 were 
laboratory studies, whereas Experiment 3.2 occurred in a university classroom. Experiments 4-5 involved an intervention to reduce the 



















Self-evaluations may vary less than recall. 
 
Reprinted from Figure 9 in Koriat, 1997, in this case, JOLs (Judgements of Learning) may be considered a type of self-evaluation. 
